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ABSTRACT 
  Judges and courts get evaluated and ranked in a variety of contexts. The 
President implicitly ranks lower-court judges when he picks some rather 
than others to be promoted within the federal judiciary. The ABA and 
other organizations evaluate and rank these same judges. For the state 
courts, governors and legislatures do similar rankings and evaluations, as 
do interest groups. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, 
produces an annual ranking of the state courts that is based on surveys of 
business lawyers. These various rankings and evaluations are often made 
on the basis of subjective information and opaque criteria. The secretive 
nature of these evaluations potentially allows organizations such as the 
Chamber of Commerce to use rankings to advance their own specific 
agenda. Our Article rests on the premise that these organizations that do 
their rankings based on opaque data and criteria need competition. 
Competition will force competing metrics to make transparent the 
underlying measures on which they are based and thereby foster the 
generation of higher quality metrics to rank judges. Using publicly 
available information and easy to reproduce measures, we construct an 
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alternate set of rankings of the state courts that we then match up against 
the rankings from the Chamber of Commerce. Our measures are 
admittedly coarse. Nevertheless, to the extent they are credible, transparent, 
and significantly different from those of organizations like the Chamber of 
Commerce, the hope is that they will force those organizations to better 
explain the methods and information that underlie their rankings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Everyone recognizes that there are better and worse courts and 
better and worse judges, but how does one evaluate courts and judges? 
Much depends on the answer to this question. Within constitutional 
constraints, state governments and the federal government have the 
power to change institutional features of their judicial systems—
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including, in the states, whether judges are elected or appointed and 
how long their terms are—and history provides many examples of 
institutional reforms motivated by the desire to improve the judiciary. 
Institutional reform is premised on the assumption that accurate 
evaluation of the quality of the existing judiciary can lead to 
improvements in the judiciary. The same point can be made about 
individual judges. In the state systems, most judges serve for limited 
terms, which means that voters, governors, and others must decide 
whether to retain or replace a particular judge. They must base this 
decision on an evaluation of that judge’s performance; otherwise the 
decision is arbitrary. 
How, then, does one evaluate judges and courts? Start with 
judges. Judges are employees of the state, and the standard economic 
approach to answering the question begins with a principal-agent 
model. The judge is the agent; the state is the principal; and the state 
should want the judge to act in the state’s interests. But the state is not 
a person; at best, its interests aggregate the interests of citizens. What 
are the interests of citizens? One might assume that they are 
something broad—well-being, justice, fairness. Or one might assume 
that they include specific policy preferences—abortion rights or not, 
gay marriage or not, and so forth. Or one might assume that citizens 
want judges to play their institutional role—to enforce the law and 
respect the Constitution. No one knows what citizens want; all of these 
assumptions might seem reasonable or not, but even if they are, the 
implications for judicial behavior are hardly clear. On the first view, 
how should judges act when citizens disagree about fairness? On the 
second view, how should judges act when citizens disagree about 
policy? On the third view, how should judges act when citizens 
disagree about the institutional role of judges—for example, about 
whether judges should enforce the original understanding of the 
Constitution or a Constitution that reflects evolving norms? None of 
these questions has a clear answer, and so the preferences of the 
principal are almost impossible to identify—though one can rule out 
certain things like bribe taking. 
Because of the difficulty of identifying the principal’s preferences, 
we cannot very easily evaluate judges on the basis of case outcomes. 
At best we can look at certain proxies, as we discuss below. The same 
problems arise for evaluating courts. Again, because the principal’s 
preferences are difficult to identify, it is hard to determine whether a 
particular judicial system advances those preferences or not. An 
additional complexity here is that judicial systems take judges as 
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inputs and produce outputs—aggregate case outcomes—that may be 
better or worse than the judges taken as individuals. Put another way, 
aggregate case outcomes are not only a function of individual judge 
quality but also a host of other factors specific to a state—making it 
difficult to rank particular judges when differences among these other 
factors may lead to variation in aggregate outcomes. For example, 
rules that limit appeal to the high court may ensure that the opinions 
are very high quality (because the judges have plenty of time), but that 
many cases are not resolved consistently (because the higher court 
does not resolve disagreements among the lower courts). 
Despite these difficulties, efforts to rank courts are increasingly 
common. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, sponsors an 
annual survey of business lawyers and reports rankings of the best and 
worst state courts.1 These rankings can have real world implications. 
Some state governments cite them to attract businesses, and they and 
other rankings have played a role in judicial elections.2 Judges are also 
evaluated on a comparative basis. The American Bar Association 
(ABA) engages in judgments of this kind with respect to lower court 
judges who are being considered for nomination to the U.S. Supreme 
Court when it rates them as well qualified, qualified, or not qualified.3 
But these evaluations are opaque. They reflect judgments of 
various individuals who do not necessarily have good judgment, 
express their views sincerely, or take account of all relevant 
 
 1. Inst. for Legal Reform, Lawsuit Climate 2008, http://www.instituteforlegalreform. 
com/index.php?option=com_ilr_harris_poll&year=2008 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
 2. One example is the advertisement on the Delaware state courts website. See First State 
Judiciary, Superior Court in the News!, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Superior Court/About 
Us/?press_99_05.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) (“The Judicial Branch of Delaware government is 
extremely pleased and gratified that our Courts rank number one in the nation in the quality of 
our litigation system.” (quoting Chief Justice Norm Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court)); 
see also Official Site of the Governor of Virginia, http://www.governor.virginia.gov/ 
MediaRelations/newsReleases/viewRelease.cfm?id=213 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) (talking about 
Virginia’s high ranking on the Chamber of Commerce survey). For discussions of the rankings 
and the need for reforms to improve rankings, see, for example, Chamber Fights to Improve 
Legal Climate, BUS. ADVOC. (Kan.), Apr. 21, 2005, http://www.kansaschamber.org/forms/ 
advo3/V3Num14.htm (noting Kansas’s drop from fourth to sixteenth). On the use of rankings to 
argue for salary increases, see generally Letter from Robert D. Ray, Iowa Judicial Comp. Task 
Force, to Nicholas Critelli, President, Iowa State Bar Ass’n (Apr. 18, 2005), 
http://www.iowabar.org/miscdocuments.nsf/2b85a4ea12f4bfac8625669d006e27ab/f0fb92e322a998
7d86256ff20049a0bb/$FILE/Judicial%20compensation.pdf. 
 3. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, RATINGS OF ARTICLE III JUDICIAL NOMINEES: 110TH 
CONGRESS (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ratings/ratings110.pdf. 
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considerations. This is also a problem for websites that feature 
anonymous comments on judges.4 
An alternative approach is to use objective measures of judicial 
quality. Academics have used citation counts as proxies for judicial 
quality.5 In earlier work, we developed an alternative approach that 
captures other important elements of judicial performance—not only 
citations, but also independence and productivity. We used these 
measures to evaluate certain institutional features of courts—how 
judges are selected6 and how they are paid7—and their relationship to 
judicial quality. 
In this Article, we generate rankings from our measures and 
compare them to the rankings generated by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and by academics in prior work. We hope that this 
comparison will stimulate thinking about how courts should be 
evaluated and ranked. Objective rankings of courts and judges provide 
a number of benefits. People who live in states with lower ranked state 
court systems may learn from the features of the judicial system (such 
as the mechanism of judge selection) used in higher ranked states. 
People whose lives that are influenced by out-of-state supreme courts 
(through, for example, the influence of the out-of-state court’s 
opinions on the decisionmaking of courts in their own states) may 
benefit from knowing which of those courts have the most influence. 
At a minimum, they might want to get involved when judges on that 
court are being selected and to contribute amicus briefs and other 
assistance during litigation with out-of-state implications. Accurate 
rankings of state courts could also help legal research. If the best 
judicial opinions are the product of courts rather than individual 
judges, then judges, lawyers, and scholars who are searching for well-
reasoned cases would benefit from knowing which courts are most 
likely to produce those cases. The presence of objective rankings may 
also force those, such as the Chamber of Commerce, providing less 
 
 4. See The Robe Probe, http://robeprobe.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2009); The Robing 
Room, http://www.therobingroom.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
 5. See, e.g., William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: 
A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeal Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1998). 
 6. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The 
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1008989. 
 7. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical 
Response to the Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 50 (2009), 
https://ojs.hup.harvard.edu/index.php/jla/article/view/3/18. 
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transparent rankings to disclose greater information and justification 
for their rankings. If, for example, a state does poorly under objective 
measures of judicial quality and well under the Chamber of Commerce 
ranking, this discrepancy will both highlight the inability of any 
ranking to capture all aspects of what people care about with respect 
to judicial quality and focus attention on the precise data and criteria 
for quality the Chamber of Commerce follows. 
There are those who will object to the general goal of 
encouraging better rankings of judicial performance. And we 
acknowledge that there is a danger here. Rankings seem to trivialize 
activities that are of public importance, and they may incite the ranked 
agents or institutions to engage in destructive competition or 
demoralize those who have no ability to escape from the bottom. The 
most serious objection to rankings is that they unavoidably rely on 
measures that neglect hard-to-observe, but important, aspects of 
performance. If those who achieve a high ranking are, nonetheless, 
rewarded with resources or public esteem, agents may distort their 
missions to do well on whatever measures are used.8 Given that 
rankings happen whether one likes them or not, it seems better to 
have a system with multiple competitors seeking to deliver better and 
more informative rankings than one in which there are only a handful 
of biased evaluators. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I sets our objective 
measures. Part II applies them to the state high courts. Part III then 
applies the same measures to individual state high court judges. 
I.  THE MEASURES 
If one starts with the proposition that some courts are better than 
other courts and some judges are better than others, then, in principle, 
one can rank courts and judges according to their quality. But the idea 
that courts can be ranked objectively, that is, by using publicly 
verifiable information about their decisions, might trouble some. Too 
much of what a court does cannot be observed or measured 
objectively, and so objective measures are more likely to mislead than 
to enlighten.9 
 
 8. See Steven Kerr, On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B, 18 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
769, 778 (1975); Wendy Nelson Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Reactivity: How 
Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds, 113 AMER. J. SOC. 1, 1 (2007). 
 9. E.g., William P. Marshall, Be Careful What You Wish for: The Problems with Using 
Empirical Rankings to Select Supreme Court Justices, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 122–29 (2004). 
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This skepticism might reflect some part of the truth but it sweeps 
too broadly. One can say the same thing about virtually any 
institution—and a court is just a particular type of institution. 
Consider the problem of evaluating employees. Employers need to 
measure the performance of employees so that they can set 
compensation, fire and promote, and in other ways provide incentives 
to work productively. Almost all types of work involve a mixture of 
activities that can be observed and measured and activities that cannot 
be observed and measured. For example, a law firm might evaluate its 
lawyers on the basis of hours billed, briefs written, cases argued and 
won, and so forth. But the firm will also be conscious about how the 
lawyer handles clients, how efficiently the lawyer spends her hours, 
and how well she gets along with colleagues. If the firm rewards her 
entirely on the basis of her measurable activities, then she will have an 
incentive to shirk with respect to the less measurable activities. In 
practice, law firms and other employers base compensation decisions 
on both types of activities, using measurable criteria as a broad gauge 
but also relying on the judgments of supervisors and colleagues 
regarding the less measurable activities. 
These same considerations apply to judges and likewise to courts. 
The objective measures that we use capture some, but not all, aspects 
of judicial quality. It would be a mistake to believe that small 
differences in measured outcomes reflect significant differences in 
quality. But where the differences are large, it is likely that the lower-
ranked judges or courts are inferior, unless a good reason exists to 
explain the difference.10 In law firm billable-hours terms, the lawyer 
billing three thousand hours per year is likely working harder than the 
one billing 1,500 hours, other things equal. Whether a firm would 
promote the three thousand–hour associate to partner may turn on 
other factors; nonetheless, a firm would almost certainly not promote 
the 1,500-hour associate. 
We use three measures of judicial quality: productivity, opinion 
quality, and independence. We apply these measures to a data set 
consisting of the decisions of all the judges of the highest court of 
every state for the three years from 1998 to 2000. We exclude the 
District of Columbia, and we treat the separate civil and criminal high 
 
 10. For further discussion of methodological issues involved in ranking judges, see generally 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical 
Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004). 
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courts in Texas and Oklahoma as, in effect, separate states. We thus 
have fifty-two “states.” 
We use these years so that we can compile enough out-of-state 
citations (used as our opinion quality measure) for meaningful 
comparison (up through 2006). Thus, we measure how often courts 
cited the cases decided from 1998 to 2000 in opinions published 
through the end of 2006. Unfortunately, many judges on the bench in 
the period have retired, and many judges on the benches are new. 
Nonetheless, our ranking is relatively comprehensive. 
There are 408 judges in our data set, about 8 per court. The 
average judge was in office 2.65 years of the 3 years that we examine 
and wrote about sixty-seven opinions over the 3-year period. We 
examine the productivity, opinion quality, and independence of all of 
the judges on the bench during the period. We aggregate our judge-
level metrics to produce productivity, citations, and independence 
measures for the courts, and rank them accordingly. 
A. Productivity 
“Productivity” refers to the number of opinions a judge publishes 
in a year. All else being equal, a judge who publishes more opinions is 
better than a judge who publishes fewer opinions. There are two 
reasons for this. First, if all opinions are published, then a judge who 
publishes more opinions decides more cases, thus resolving more 
disputes between people. Dispute resolution is a judge’s core function, 
and the more disputes a judge resolves, the greater is the service that 
she is providing. Note that in some states judges decide cases without 
issuing opinions. In these states, one cannot assume that judges who 
publish more opinions also decide more cases. States also vary in 
terms of whether intermediate appellate courts screen cases before 
they get to the high court and in terms of the degree to which the high 
court’s jurisdiction is discretionary. Although we do not do it here, one 
can, to a limited extent, control for those institutional differences by 
using information about publication and jurisdictional rules and 
practices.11 Further, scholarship from judges and court watchers tells us 
that published opinions are more likely to involve effort from the 
judges themselves, whereas unpublished dispositions and short orders 
 
 11. See Choi et al., supra note 6 (manuscript at 26). Controlling for these institutional 
differences does not have a meaningful effect on our regression results in this Article. 
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are more likely to be the work of secondary personnel.12 Publication 
rates, therefore, can provide a better measure of individual-judge 
effort than overall case-decision rates. Second, a judge who publishes 
an opinion shares her reasoning with the parties and with other judges 
who seek to understand the resolution of the dispute. High publication 
rates in this way benefit the system and suggest a high-quality judge. 
The most productive court in our 1998 to 2000 dataset was 
Georgia’s (58.33 opinions per judge-year); the least productive was 
New Mexico’s (10.07 opinions per judge-year); the median state was 
Kansas (23.0 opinions per judge per year). A judge who publishes 
frequently might write lower-quality opinions than a judge who writes 
and publishes less frequently. So productivity is only a partial measure 
of a judge’s merits. We address opinion quality (our measure of 
influence) in Section B below. 
B. Opinion Quality 
We measure opinion quality by using a proxy: the number of 
times that out-of-state courts cited the opinion. For these purposes, we 
consider only the citation rate of published majority decisions of the 
state high court in question. We measure this value by totaling the 
number of times the opinion in question was cited by other state 
courts, federal courts (other than the home federal circuit), and the 
U.S. Supreme Court. One can use other proxies for quality as well, 
such as law review citations; these measures are highly correlated with 
out-of-state citations by state high courts.13 We assume that a high-
quality opinion is more likely to be useful for out-of-state courts and 
therefore is more likely to be cited.14 
The citations measure can be given two different interpretations. 
We use it as a proxy for the intrinsic quality of the reasoning in the 
opinion. A high-quality opinion benefits the litigants themselves and 
everyone in the state whose activities might bring them under the law 
at issue. But out-of-state citations are also a (more) direct measure of 
out-of-state influence. It is not entirely clear whether a state’s 
residents would prefer to have judges who are influential out of state 
or not; these judges might be better than are necessary to get the job 
done, and they benefit outsiders rather than residents. On the other 
 
 12. See Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This!: Why We Don’t Allow 
Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43–44, 81. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Landes et al., supra note 5, at 271. 
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hand, influence and high quality opinions are highly correlated. 
Focusing on influence therefore will likely measure an attribute—high 
quality opinions—that benefits litigants and in-state residents. 
Citation measures, while extensively used to measure quality 
across a variety of disciplines, have also been criticized. We will not 
rehash the general debate over citation measures, but mention a 
couple of issues that are more specific to the type of data at which we 
are looking. With judges, critics argue that citation counts measure the 
wrong quality. In contrast to academic work, in which creativity and 
innovation are highly valued, judicial decisionmaking is better when it 
is conservative and minimalist. Citation counts, the argument goes, 
likely reward judges who are more creative and expansive in their 
articulations of the law, since courts are more likely to cite such 
articulations.15 If anything, high citation counts may be a measure of 
bad judging if the “better” approach to lawmaking is to decide cases 
narrowly. 
We are skeptical of this argument because, if the premise is that 
most judges are seeking to make “good” law and that type of law is 
narrow and minimalist, then it seems likely that these judges will look 
to precedent from judges who write opinions in a narrow and 
minimalist fashion. In other words, if judges value minimalism, then 
minimalist opinions will be cited more, not the creative and expansive 
ones. One way to test this premise is to separate out the judges who 
have the highest citation counts and then to ask whether these are 
judges who are viewed (for example, in the press) as the ones who are 
known for their creativity and expansiveness in opinion writing. 
Citation counts are also often subject to “superstar” effects, under 
which the top performer grabs the vast majority of the credit and the 
next best performers, even though they have also produced a high 
quality product, get very few citations.16 When one is aggregating 
performance across a number of subject areas, the superstar effect can 
skew one’s results in that it can potentially give disproportionate credit 
to the top performers in particular areas and inadequate credit to 
those finishing at lower levels. So, to illustrate the point, let us say that 
North Carolina judges write the third-best opinions in all ten subject 
areas and that Montana judges write the best opinions in one area (for 
example, natural resource conservation) but terrible opinions in the 
 
 15. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 149 (2008). 
 16. See Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial 
Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (2005). 
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other nine subject areas. Because of superstar effects, Montana’s one 
first-place finish could cause it to finish, in the aggregate count, ahead 
of North Carolina. A partial correction for these effects can be 
implemented by breaking down the citation counts for both courts and 
judges by subject areas. 
Overall, California was the most-cited court for the 1998 to 2000 
period, with 33.76 outside citations per judge-year (majority opinions 
only). Oklahoma’s criminal high court was the least cited, with 3.69 
outside citations per judge-year. The median state was South Dakota 
(13.07 outside citations per judge-year). 
C. Independence 
“Independence” refers to the judge’s ability to withstand partisan 
pressures, or disinclination to indulge partisan preferences, when 
deciding cases. Independence is a hallmark of judicial quality: judicial 
decisions should be based on the legal merits of the case, not on the 
judge’s political preferences or other irrelevant considerations such as 
the political power of a party to litigation. Our measure of 
independence captures part of this idea, namely, that a judge’s 
decision should be unrelated to partisanship. Our measure gives a 
judge a high score if he is more likely to vote with opposite-party 
judges and a low score if he is more likely to vote with same-party 
judges. We focus on votes by judges when they face an opposing 
opinion, defined as either a majority opinion when the judge writes a 
dissent or a dissent when the judge joins the majority. We assume that 
a judge exhibits independence when she writes an opposing opinion 
against a copartisan. 
For each judge, we obtained information on the political 
affiliation of the judge. In a few states, all the high court judges belong 
to the same party in our data set, and so we cannot assign those judges 
an independence score.17 In our sample, 220 judges were classified as 
Democrats and 170 as Republicans (with 16 no-data or Independent 
Party judges). 
 
 17. For a description of our independence measure, see Choi et al., supra note 6 (manuscript 
at 17). In another paper, Choi and Gulati treat a 0 independence score as highest on the theory 
that zero independence means that party affiliation makes no difference to case outcomes. See 
Choi & Gulati, supra note 10, at 66. For purposes of this Article, we treat a judge who votes 
against partisan affiliation as likely to be more independent, as it shows that she feels strongly 
about the outcome. It is possible that the judge switched ideologies while sitting, but prior 
scholarship indicates that this is unusual. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 180 (2002). 
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Two variables are relevant to calculating the independence of 
each judge: Opposite_Party and Opposite_Pool. We define 
Opposite_Party as the number of opposing opinions written by the 
judge of interest against a judge of the opposite party divided by the 
number of opposing opinions written against a judge of either party 
from 1998 to 2000. This variable measures a judge’s propensity to side 
with copartisans. Not all opposing opinions are driven by ideology. A 
judge who dissents at random would dissent 70 percent of the time 
against an opposite party judge if the background pool of majority 
opinions consisted of 70 percent opposite party authored opinions. To 
take into account the background pool of opinions, we define 
Opposite_Pool as the total number of majority opinions authored by 
an opposite party judge divided by the total number of majority 
opinions authored by either an opposite or same party judge (not 
including the judge in question) from 1998 to 2000. 
We define independence as Opposite_Pool minus 
Opposite_Party. A more negative independence score corresponds to 
a judge who writes opposing opinions against opposite-party judges 
more frequently than the background pool of majority opinions 
authored by opposite-party judges. Conversely, a more positive 
independence score corresponds to an authoring judge who writes 
opposing opinions less frequently against opposite-party judges 
compared with the background pool of opinions (and thus more 
frequently against copartisans). We treat a more positive 
independence score as indicative of a more independent judge. 
Our independence measure does not capture all the meanings of 
judicial independence. Judges who take bribes or favor wealthy or 
powerful litigants are not independent, but our independence measure 
does not capture such activity.18 One can also imagine cases in which a 
judge’s policy preferences influence her decisions, which is improper, 
but these policy preferences are idiosyncratic and do not track partisan 
divisions. Our measure misses these cases as well. Our goal in creating 
this measure was to get as close as possible to a measure of 
partisanship—that is, Republicans siding with other Republicans 
simply because they were Republicans. This approach contrasts with 
 
 18. In many countries, the concern about judges taking bribes is a real one. And in those 
contexts, the relevant measure of independence should include some measure of judicial 
corruption. But in the United States, where high court judges have the option of earning higher 
sums in private practice, this concern may be misplaced. It is unlikely that these judges would 
engage in corrupt behavior and risk criminal sanctions when they could instead simply move into 
the private sector. 
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the more general approach in the academic literature on political bias, 
which looks at voting as a function of certain policy positions—in 
which one is counted as voting in a liberal or conservative fashion if 
one supports a particular policy position (for example, ruling against 
the hospital and for the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case might 
be measured as a liberal outcome).19 The more general approach, in 
our view, might capture policy preferences but does not isolate 
partisanship. 
The independence score ranges from -1 (least independent) to 1 
(most independent). The court with the highest mean independence 
score among judges for the 1998 to 2000 period was Rhode Island’s, 
with a mean independence score of 0.19; the least independent court 
was that of Mississippi, which had a mean independence score of -0.31. 
The median was -0.02. 
D. Composite Measures 
Suppose that a court ranks highly on one measure but not so well 
on the other two measures, whereas another court does worse on the 
first measure but better on the other two. Which court is better? 
Ideally, we would have a theory that tells us how much to weigh each 
measure, but we have no such theory. One might think that 
independence is much more important than productivity and quality, 
or one might think not. Equal weight for each measure is no less 
arbitrary than counting only one measure and ignoring the other two. 
This problem is not necessarily serious. Suppose courts that do 
well on one measure also tend to do well on other measures. If the 
rankings along each measure are largely consistent, then overall 
rankings can easily be obtained. As the rankings become less 
consistent, noise is introduced into the rankings, but it does not defeat 
the exercise. Plus, users can decide for themselves how much they 
weight the different measures and interpret our results accordingly. 
Our approach allows for various weightings. Under this 
composite approach, we construct rankings under several possible 
weightings, and we display them in a manner that allows the reader to 
focus on whatever measures she believes are most important. 
 
 19. E.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. 
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 14), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
997491. 
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II.  RANKING THE STATE HIGH COURTS 
A. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce Rankings 
The most influential ranking of state courts—focusing on the 
entire legal systems, not just the high courts—has been produced by 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce 
conducts annual surveys of lawyers that ask them for their evaluations 
of state courts.20 
The Chamber of Commerce surveys ask senior lawyers at 
corporations that earn more than $100 million per year in revenues to 
grade state court systems, from A to F, and aggregate their responses.21 
In the next Section, we compare the Chamber of Commerce rankings 
and rankings produced by other academics with our rankings. At the 
outset, we should note a number of reasons that might explain why the 
Chamber’s rankings might diverge somewhat from academic rankings. 
First, academic studies all rate state high courts, whereas the Chamber 
of Commerce evaluates the entire judicial system. It is possible 
(although, we suspect, unlikely) that good state high courts preside 
over mediocre trial and lower appellate courts. Second, an important 
element of the academic studies is out-of-state influence, whereas the 
Chamber of Commerce focuses on in-state performance. Out-of-state 
influence might be a good proxy for the quality of high court opinions 
(and we use it as just such a proxy in our rankings), but it also might 
not be; it is possible that a supreme court that writes influential 
opinions is not fair or predictable, though it is hard to believe that it is 
not competent. Third, as noted, academic studies (that use external 
citations to opinions as a key element), in effect, survey out-of-state 
judges, whereas the Chamber of Commerce surveys business lawyers. 
Business lawyers might have systematically different attitudes toward 
judicial decisionmaking than other lawyers. Business lawyers probably 
give high marks to courts that decide cases in a manner businesses 
 
 20. Related are reports of so-called judicial hellholes put out by organizations like the 
American Tort Reform Association (that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce applauded). See Press 
Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Report Bolsters Harris Poll Finding on Abusive Legal 
Climates (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2004/december/04-163.htm. 
 21. Inst. for Legal Reform, State Resources Center: Executive Summary, http://www. 
instituteforlegalreform.com/index.php?option=com_ilr_harris_poll&id=1&view=lawsuit_climate
&Itemid=60 (last visited Feb. 11, 2009); Inst. for Legal Reform, State Resources Center: 
Methodology, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/index.php?option=com_ilr_harris_poll&id 
=7&view=lawsuit_climate&Itemid=60 (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). 
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like—rejecting punitive damages, for example—whereas out-of-state 
judges need not share these views. 
We have more to say about the methodological assumptions of 
the Chamber of Commerce study.22 For now, it is sufficient to point 
out that the Chamber of Commerce rankings have been more 
influential than the academic studies. They have been cited by state 
legislators to criticize their judiciaries and ask for reform, by a judicial 
pay compensation commission to justify a salary increase, and by two 
governors to advertise the attractiveness of their states for big 
business.23 The Chamber of Commerce has used its annual survey of 
state court systems to pressure state legislatures to improve their court 
systems.24 It has also run advertisements in major newspapers in states 
ranking low on its surveys before some elections.25 Other reform 
organizations such as the American Legislative Exchange Council 
have incorporated the Chamber of Commerce’s rankings into their 
broader measures of state performance and analyses of the reasons for 
differences in state economic success rates.26 Some academics have 
also used the rankings in empirical studies of the relationship between 
judicial quality and institutional design.27 Groups like the ABA and 
 
 22. See infra Part II.C.5. 
 23. See supra note 2. 
 24. See Press Release, Tom Donohue, President & CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
Release of the 2006 Harris Poll State Liability Rankings (Mar. 27, 2006), http://www.uschamber. 
com/press/speeches/2006/060327_ilr_rankings_remarks.htm (“But there’s still quite a ways to go 
before we can rid our courts of lawsuit abuse and correct the deep flaws in our legal system. One 
of the key weapons in our arsenal is the annual State Liability Systems Ranking Study. Since the 
inception of the study, it has become the benchmark against which businesses, elected officials, 
the media and other opinion leaders measure their state’s legal climate. They want to see how 
they stack up against other states, and also how well—or poorly—the system is serving 
employers, workers and consumers.”). 
 25. See ABA Div. for Bar Servs., Bar Associations’ Response to Chamber of Commerce Ad 
Campaign, http://www.abanet.org/barserv/tortreform.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) (reporting 
on advertisements run in both national newspapers like the New York Times, the Washington 
Post, and the Wall Street Journal and in local newspapers in Illinois, West Virginia, California, 
and Mississippi). 
 26. See ARTHUR B. LAFFER & STEPHEN MOORE, RICH STATES, POOR STATES 40 (2007) 
(using the 2002 Chamber of Commerce rankings as one of sixteen factors in their state 
competitiveness rankings). 
 27. E.g., Russell S. Sobel & Joshua C. Hall, The Effect of Judicial Selection Processes on 
Judicial Quality: The Role of Partisan Politics, 27 CATO J. 69, 71 (2007); Russell S. Sobel, Matt E. 
Ryan & Joshua C. Hall, Electoral Pressures and the Legal System: Friends or Foes?, in LAW 
WITHOUT ROMANCE: PUBLIC CHOICE AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (E. Lopez ed.) (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 5), available at http://joshua.c.hall.googlepages.com/electoralpressures.pdf; Daniel 
Berkowitz & Karen Clay, Initial Conditions, Institutional Dynamics and Economic Performance: 
Evidence from the American States 7–8 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 615, 2004), 
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Public Citizen, the Ralph Nader–led organization, have complained 
that these rankings are biased toward the interests of big business.28 
But in the absence of meaningful competitive rankings, these 
objections are the equivalent of law schools urging students to ignore 
the U.S. News and World Report rankings. It just will not work. 
B. Prior Academic Literature on Ranking State Courts 
We are aware of five academic articles that rank the state high 
courts. 
Lawrence Friedman, Robert Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, and 
Stanton Wheeler examined a data set consisting of approximately six 
thousand cases from the state high courts for discrete intervals of time 
in the 1870–1970 period.29 Focusing on sixteen state high courts, the 
study uses the evolution in patterns of opinion writing style and 
citations over a century to draw inferences about court behavior. The 
study does not provide a detailed ranking of all the state high courts in 
terms of citations but does give a rough sense of which states 
dominated over the different periods during that century. In the 
quarter century 1870–1895, the stars were New York, Massachusetts, 
and California. New York stood out during the early portion of that 
period, but its influence began to wane by the end. By 1925, the courts 
in Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania began to emerge as 
influential. Finally, in 1945–1970, California emerged as a star. New 
Jersey, Texas, and Illinois also were among the more influential states 
 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=485003 (using the 2002 Chamber of Commerce rankings to 
measure court quality in the different states); see also Michael J. Hicks, Reduce the Cost of Civil 
Litigation and Depoliticize the Courts, in UNLEASHING CAPITALISM 185, 189 (Russell S. Sobel 
ed., 2007) (referring to a study by Professors Sobel and Hall that uses the Chamber of Commerce 
rankings). Neither of the latter two studies mentions that the Chamber and Commerce data 
reflect the views of only lawyers at corporations with annual revenues of at least $100 million. 
 28. See Press Release, Pub. Citizen, New U.S. Chamber of Commerce Poll Ranking States’ 
Liability Systems Is Part of a Disinformation Campaign to Restrict Consumer Rights (Mar. 9, 
2005), http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/0309-10.htm; see also PUB. CITIZEN, CLASS 
ACTION “JUDICIAL HELLHOLES”: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS LACKING 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf (featuring a complaint regarding the judicial 
hellholes reports); Letter from Dennis W. Archer, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Thomas J. 
Donohue, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1 (Mar. 11, 2004), http://www.abanet.org/media/ 
statementsletters/chamberopenletter.pdf (accusing the Chamber of Commerce of mounting a 
campaign against members of the legal system to avoid taking responsibility for the nation’s 
financial problems). 
 29. Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 773, 774 (1981). 
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in terms of citations. Overall, for 1870–1970, the four top states were 
New York, California, Massachusetts, and Illinois. 
Rodney Mott’s 1936 study covers a more limited period, roughly 
from 1900 to 1930.30 Mott uses multiple measures of court prestige that 
include (1) a survey of law professors who were asked about the 
esteem with which they held the various courts, (2) the extent to which 
cases from the different courts found their way into casebooks, (3) 
citations from other state high courts, and (4) citations from the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Table 1 reports the top and bottom ten states in 
Mott’s composite ranking. Consistent with the numbers from 
Friedman et al., Mott reports New York, Massachusetts, California, 
and Illinois as among the top performers. The steep drop in numbers 
from the top two states, New York and Massachusetts, and the 
others—on all of Mott’s measures—is worth noting. This superstar 
effect, where a couple of states dramatically outdo the others, suggests 
the strong possibility that modifications of the measures—for example, 
adjusting for the number of judges on the court—would still leave the 
superstar states at the top. At the bottom end in Mott’s composite 
rankings are Florida and the western states of Nevada, Arizona, New 
Mexico, and Wyoming. Many of the western states were still relatively 
young, and their low ranks may have been due to their less-developed 
bodies of case law. 
Roughly fifty years later, building on Mott’s work but focusing 
exclusively on citation measures, Gregory Caldeira reranked the state 
high courts.31 Caldeira looks at a single year, 1975, and his method of 
calculation differs from Mott’s; Caldeira adjusts the citation numbers 
to discount for the propensity of some states to make outside citations 
for reasons other than the quality of the state high courts. For 
example, Alaska’s court might have cited to more outside state courts 
than did other state courts because it didn’t have much of its own case 
law. Caldeira also looks only at a single measure, citations from the 
high courts to each other. Table 1 reports the top and bottom 
performers in Caldeira’s rankings. Despite the half-century gap 
between his study and Mott’s, the states in the top ten are similar. The 
only difference between 1930 and 1975 in the top ten states is that 
Washington replaces Minnesota. The suggestion of a superstar effect 
present in Mott’s results—with the top two states significantly 
 
 30. Rodney L. Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 295, 295–96 (1936). 
 31. Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83, 87–
93 (1983). 
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outdoing the others—remains, except that the two superstar states are 
now California and New York as opposed to New York and 
Massachusetts. At the bottom, there are a number of new states, the 
three holdovers at the bottom being Nevada, South Dakota, and 
Wyoming. 
In 2002, Scott Comparato updated Caldeira’s study with data 
from 2000 using similar measurement methods.32 Whereas Caldeira’s 
study looks at every case cited in 1975, Comparato uses random 
samples of thirty cases from each state court. Despite the twenty-five-
year gap, the identities of the top performing states remain 
remarkably stable. California and New York take the top two 
superstar spots and remain a good way ahead of the others. New 
entrants into the top ranks include Minnesota and Colorado. At the 
bottom, there is more turnover, with Texas, Vermont, Louisiana, and 
Tennessee showing up. 
In 2007, Jake Dear and Edward Jessen offered a ranking based on 
a novel measure of influence.33 Contending that the standard measure 
of outside court citations was crude, Dear and Jessen count the 
number of times the Shepherd’s citation service designated a decision 
as “followed or used as persuasive authority for the period from 1940 
to 2005.”34 California again dominates, with Washington coming in 
second. Massachusetts and New York remain in the top ten, and states 
such as Oregon and Kansas show up for the first time. At the bottom 
are some new entrants, including Virginia and Delaware. For our 
purposes, the portion of their data that is most interesting is that which 
covers the same years that our study does, that is, 1998–2000. In Table 
1, we report the rankings using the “followed” citations for cases 
decided from 1998–2000. A caveat: this is not the ranking that Dear 
and Jessen use in their article; they do not attach too much weight to 
comparisons of followed citations from relatively recent time periods 
since followed citations take time to accumulate.35 
The final ranking comes from the Chamber of Commerce study 
(for purposes of our discussion, we focus on the 2002 rankings) 
 
 32. Scott A. Comparato, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts Revisited (Apr. 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 33. Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, “Followed Rates” and Leading State Cases, 1940–2005, 
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 690–93 (2007). 
 34. Id. 
 35. For 1940–2005, the top ten states, in order, are California, Washington, Colorado, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Kansas, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oregon, and New York. Id. at 694. 
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discussed above.36 In this study, close to 1,500 senior lawyers working 
at firms with revenues of at least $100 million annually were surveyed 
each year since 2001 for their evaluations of the different state legal 
systems. Two of the survey questions asked for evaluations of judicial 
performance, and presumably the performance of the high courts is 
correlated with that of the lower courts in the state. These rankings 
are at odds with the other rankings discussed. The states showing up at 
the top in 2002, for example, include Delaware, Virginia, and 
Nebraska, states that have not shown up at the top on any of the 
citation based rankings (in fact, Delaware and Virginia have shown up 
closer to the bottom on some of the citation counts). At the other end, 
the Chamber of Commerce surveys have the perennial superstar 
performer on the citation measures, California, near the bottom 
(ranked thirty-fourth for judicial impartiality, twenty-eighth for 
judicial competence, and forty-fifth under the “overall” ranking), 
along with another perennial front runner in the citation studies, 
Illinois (ranked thirty-eighth for judicial impartiality, thirty-ninth for 
judicial competence, and thirty-fourth under the “overall” ranking).37 
Table 1.  Prior Studies 
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 36. For the latest rankings and associate advertising, see Inst. for Legal Reform, 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
 37. Less directly on point are a handful of other studies that could also be read to contain 
rankings of the states but that we do not discuss because they are tangential to our inquiry. For 
example, a 1981 study by Professors Canon and Baum compared the states’ innovativeness in 
terms of being willing to adopt a set of twenty-three plaintiff-friendly tort law doctrines. Bradley 
C. Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of 
Diffusion Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 975, 975 (1981). Also, a number of 
other studies examine the citation patterns of individual state courts. Professor Merryman, for 
example, in two studies twenty years apart, looked at the citation practices of the California 
Supreme Court, which could be read to be California’s ranking of the rest of the state high 
courts. John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court 
Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 613–14 (1954); John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of 
Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 
1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 381 (1977). 
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Bottom 10 performers are listed from highest ranked state to 
lowest ranked state (e.g., Mississippi is the lowest ranked state based 
on the 2002 Chamber of Commerce rankings reported in the table). 
Our study differs from these prior studies in several ways. First, 
we use three measures rather than one measure of judicial quality—
productivity, independence, and opinion quality. Second, for opinion 
quality we use citations (a broader measure than the number of 
followed citations that Dear and Jessen used), but we do not adjust 
CGP IN FINAL 5/5/2009 4:03:09 PM 
2009] RANKING STATE HIGH COURTS 1333 
them for state size (unlike Caldeira and Comparato). Third, we did 
not survey lawyers. The differences between our approach and the 
earlier studies are driven partly by a different focus—the quality of the 
courts rather than (only) their influence—and partly by our different 
judgments about how to measure influence. We return to these 
differences when we compare our results to those of the earlier 
studies. 
C. Ranking the Courts 
1. The Court Systems.  All states have a hierarchical system, with 
trial courts at the bottom and a supreme or highest court at the top. 
Most, but not all, states have intermediate appellate courts. Two 
states—Texas and Oklahoma—have two high courts, one for criminal 
appeals and the other for civil appeals. Many high courts have 
mandatory jurisdiction: they must hear appeals. Others have 
discretionary jurisdiction. Most have a combination of mandatory 
jurisdiction for some types of cases (such as death penalty cases) and 
discretionary jurisdiction for other types of cases. Courts have 
different rules and norms for a range of practices, such as whether 
opinions must, or need not, be published. No doubt courts have 
different internal cultures reflecting different attitudes toward 
dissenting, writing quickly or slowly, writing comprehensively or 
briefly, citing generously or minimally, and so forth. Some high courts 
might benefit from the high-quality work of lower courts or suffer 
from their low-quality work. 
Two features of high courts have received considerable public and 
scholarly attention lately: their selection systems and judicial pay. The 
selection system refers to how judges are selected and retained. There 
are, roughly, three systems. In appointments systems, the governor 
(sometimes the state legislature) selects judges, sometimes with the 
advice of a commission. In merit systems, a nonpartisan or bipartisan 
body picks judges; at the end of the judge’s term, a retention election 
(up or down vote) determines whether the judge has another term. In 
electoral systems, judges are elected; these systems can be further 
divided into partisan and nonpartisan systems—in partisan systems, 
the judge’s party appears on the ballot; in nonpartisan systems, it is 
not. Table 2 identifies the selection systems of all of the states as of 
1998–2000, the period from which we take our data. 
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A further point is that judicial terms vary, from as little as four 
years to as much as fourteen years, with lifetime tenure in three states. 
Roughly speaking, appointed judges enjoy the longest tenure, merit 
selection judges the next longest, and elected judges the shortest 
tenure. One might think of the systems as reflecting the degree to 
which the public directly affects the identity of judges: they have the 
least effect in appointment systems, the most effect in electoral system, 
with the merit system in between. 
Judicial compensation also varies. In 2007, the median income of 
high court judges was $149,200 and ranged from $106,185 to $209,521.38 
The employment conditions of judges differ in other ways as well. 
Judges enjoy different levels of secretarial and clerical support. 
 
 38. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SURVEY OF JUDICIAL SALARIES 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_JudComJudSal070107Pub.pdf. 
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Roughly speaking, elected judges are paid less than appointed judges; 
they are also more likely to have graduated from a local law school.39 
Finally, the mix of cases that reach high courts differs from state 
to state. Some states are highly urban, whereas others are relatively 
rural; some have certain types of industries that other lack; some have 
higher crime rates than others; and so on. For this reason, comparing 
different high courts is hazardous and complex. 
2. Productivity.  Table 3 provides productivity results by state, 
ranked by published opinions per judge-year. The fourth column 
provides aggregate productivity (Total Opinion: the total number of 
published opinions for the 1998 to 2000 time period); the fifth column 
provides the sum of each judge’s presence on the bench during the 
period of our study (Judge-Years); the last column provides a measure 
of efficiency—opinions per judge-year. The two measures are highly 
correlated (correlation coefficient = 0.92; significant at the <1 percent 
level). In other words, states publishing a lot of opinions are not 
simply doing so because they have more judges. Judges in Georgia, at 
close to sixty opinions per judge per year, are doing something 
different than their colleagues in New Mexico, at closer to ten 
opinions per judge per year. But perhaps, on further examination, it 
will turn out that the Georgia opinions are all short, low-quality 
opinions whereas the ones from New Mexico are carefully crafted 
gems. 
Table 3.  Number of Published Opinions 






1 GA NE 1225 21 58.33 
2 MS PE 1437 29 49.55 
3 AR PE 1038 21 49.43 
4 AL PE 1417 30 47.23 
5 OH NE 989 21 47.10 
6 MT NE 968 21 46.10 
7 PA PE 941 21 44.81 
8 ND NE 703 16 43.94 
9 IN M 573 15 38.20 
10 WY M 548 15 36.53 
 
 39. See Choi et al., supra note 6 (manuscript at 41). 
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11 FL M 709 21 33.76 
12 CT A 707 23 30.74 
13 NE M 699 23 30.39 
14 ID NE 477 16 29.81 
15 IL PE 642 22 29.18 
16 CA M 605 21 28.81 
17 ME A 718 26 27.62 
18 MA A 608 23 26.43 
19 IA M 715 28 25.54 
20 AK M 446 18 24.78 
21 UT M 420 17 24.71 
22 SD M 366 15 24.40 
23 SC A 387 16 24.19 
24 MD M 523 22 23.77 
25 TN M 373 16 23.31 
26 WV PE 346 15 23.07 
27 KS M 483 21 23.00 
28 TX_CRIM PE 583 26 22.42 
29 LA NE 525 24 21.88 
30 NH A 366 17 21.53 
31 WA NE 578 28 20.64 
32 VA A 413 21 19.67 
33 MN NE 452 24 18.83 
34 KY NE 411 22 18.68 
35 WI NE 386 21 18.38 
36 VT A 274 15 18.27 
37 RI A 273 15 18.20 
38 NY A 380 22 17.27 
39 CO M 386 23 16.78 
40 MI NE 389 24 16.21 
41 OK_CIV M 435 28 15.54 
42 NV NE 259 18 14.39 
43 OK_CRIM M 230 16 14.38 
44 NJ A 376 27 13.93 
45 TX_CIV PE 347 27 12.85 
46 HI A 225 18 12.50 
47 OR NE 245 21 11.67 
48 AZ M 172 15 11.47 
49 MO M 252 22 11.45 
50 NC PE 262 23 11.39 
51 DE A 163 15 10.87 
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52 NM PE 151 15 10.07 
One striking result is that the top four—Georgia, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, Alabama—do not show up at the top of any of the earlier 
ranking studies using citations. Mississippi, Arkansas, and Alabama do 
show up in the top ten of the Chamber of Commerce survey, 
suggesting that the senior business lawyers who were surveyed might 
recognize that the courts of those states work hard. These traditionally 
overlooked states may deserve more credit.40 
3. Citations.  Table 4 provides out-of-state citations to majority 
opinions produced by a court. The fourth column (Total Citations) 
reports the total outside state citations to majority opinions issued 
from 1998 to 2000 and provides a measure of the overall influence of 
the court; the last column (Citations/Judge-Year) provides a measure 
of efficiency, focusing on number of outside citations per judge-year 
for the state. The two measures are highly correlated (correlation 
coefficient = 0.89; significant at the <1 percent level). 
At the top, California is far ahead of the other states in both total 
number of citations and citations per judge-year. The number of 
outside citations per judge per year is close to thirty-five for California 
judges, whereas the equivalent number for judges at the courts at the 
bottom is under five. The inference we draw is that the quality of 
opinions being produced by courts at the top and those at the bottom 
are likely different. After California, there is a sharp drop in the 
numbers of citations (from over thirty-three per judge per year to 
around twenty-two per judge per year) and also more clustering, with 
Delaware, Montana, and Washington being close together in the 
twenty-two-citation range. New York, a star on prior citation count 
studies does not appear in the top twenty (it is number twenty-four), 
below states like Arkansas and South Carolina, whose judiciaries have 
 
 40. A ready objection to using the number of published opinions is that some states have 
norms of producing and publishing short opinions and others use longer and more detailed 
opinions. If one assumes that the shorter opinions involve less effort (a questionable, but 
plausible assumption), then the better measure of effort might be the number of published pages. 
Alternatively, one could look at the number of Westlaw KeyCites, which would provide a sense 
of the number of issues that opinion tackled (shorter and more routine opinions would have 
fewer Westlaw KeyCites). Unreported here, we calculated state rankings on each of these 
measures as well. The rankings do change. On the Westlaw KeyCite measure, for example, the 
top five states are South Carolina, Montana, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Georgia. On the 
number of pages measure, the top states are Montana, Pennsylvania, California, Mississippi and 
Maryland. 
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traditionally had weaker reputations. Massachusetts, another 
historically dominant state, remains among the top performers. 
Finally, to go back to the Georgia–New Mexico comparison from 
the discussion of productivity, we see that, on quality, Georgia drops 
from the top position to twenty-eighth position and New Mexico rises 
from the bottom to the thirty-seventh position. At least at first cut, 
maybe the Georgia judges produce more opinions at the expense of 
quality (and vice versa for New Mexico). 
Table 4.  Out-of-State Citations to Majority Opinions 




1 CA M 709 21 33.76 
2 DE A 336 15 22.40 
3 MT NE 468 21 22.29 
4 WA NE 611 28 21.82 
5 MA A 469 23 20.39 
6 MD M 448 22 20.36 
7 ND NE 316 16 19.75 
8 KS M 388 21 18.48 
9 CT A 405 23 17.61 
10 NJ A 474 27 17.56 
11 CO M 382 23 16.61 
12 IN M 244 15 16.27 
13 NE M 371 23 16.13 
14 IL PE 354 22 16.09 
15 AR PE 337 21 16.05 
16 OH NE 337 21 16.05 
17 PA PE 336 21 16.00 
18 SC A 245 16 15.31 
19 AK M 273 18 15.17 
20 TN M 242 16 15.13 
21 IA M 403 28 14.39 
22 WV PE 206 15 13.73 
23 VT A 206 15 13.73 
24 NY A 301 22 13.68 
25 MN NE 321 24 13.38 
26 NH A 225 17 13.24 
27 SD M 196 15 13.07 
28 GA NE 262 21 12.48 
29 AZ M 187 15 12.47 
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30 VA A 261 21 12.43 
31 WY M 184 15 12.27 
32 WI NE 256 21 12.19 
33 MS PE 322 29 11.10 
34 ME A 284 26 10.92 
35 AL PE 325 30 10.83 
36 FL M 208 21 9.90 
37 NM PE 143 15 9.53 
38 ID NE 148 16 9.25 
39 TX_CIV PE 243 27 9.00 
40 RI A 131 15 8.73 
41 NV NE 157 18 8.72 
42 MI NE 208 24 8.67 
43 HI A 150 18 8.33 
44 UT M 134 17 7.88 
45 NC PE 170 23 7.39 
46 LA NE 159 24 6.63 
47 KY NE 145 22 6.59 
48 OR NE 137 21 6.52 
49 OK_CIV M 160 28 5.71 
50 MO M 115 22 5.23 
51 TX_CRIM PE 105 26 4.04 
52 OK_CRIM M 59 16 3.69 
Next, we compare our top ten states with those of the roughly 
contemporary citation studies, and the Chamber of Commerce survey 
measure of competence. 
Table 5.  Comparison of Influence Rankings 
Top 10 Performers    
Our Citation Results 2000 Comparato 
Citation Ranking  
1998–2000 
Followed Citations 
2002 Chamber of 
Commerce Survey— 
Judges’ Competence 
California California California Delaware 
Delaware New York Washington Washington 
Montana Minnesota Nebraska Virginia 
Washington Pennsylvania Kansas Iowa 
Massachusetts Colorado Massachusetts Minnesota 
Maryland Michigan Connecticut Colorado 
North Dakota Washington Montana Arizona 
Kansas Illinois Iowa Connecticut 
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Connecticut New Jersey Maryland New York 
New Jersey Wisconsin Texas-Civil Wisconsin 
    
Bottom 10 Performers    
Our Citation Results 2000 Comparato 
Citation Ranking  
1998–2000 
Followed Citations 
2002 Chamber of 
Commerce Survey—
Judges’ Competence 
Hawaii Texas Idaho S. Carolina 
Utah Louisiana Arizona Kentucky 
North Carolina West Virginia Utah Hawaii 
Louisiana Rhode Island Delaware Arkansas 
Kentucky North Dakota  Louisiana Texas 
Oregon Tennessee  Oregon Montana 
Oklahoma Civil Nevada Kentucky W. Virginia 
Missouri Alaska Hawaii Louisiana 
Texas Criminal Maine New Mexico Alabama 
Oklahoma Criminal Vermont Missouri Mississippi 
    
Correl. coeff. between 
our citation results 
and the underlying 
score for each 
influence ranking 0.388 0.565 0.280 
p-value* 0.005 0.000 0.049 
    
Spearman rank coeff. 
between our citation-
result ranking and 













p-value** 0.201 0.000 0.028 
*p-value is from a two-sided t-test of the null hypothesis that there is no correlation. 
**p-value is from a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the two rankings in question are 
independent. 
Bottom 10 performers are listed from highest ranked state to lowest ranked state (e.g., 
Oklahoma Criminal is the lowest ranked state based on our citation results). 
Our results overlap with the results of all three studies, more so 
with the two academic citation studies. The correlation coefficients 
between our outside citation measure and the underlying scores 
behind each of the three other rankings in Table 5 are all positive and 
significant. The Spearman rank coefficient between our citation 
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ranking and the three other rankings, similarly, is positive (although 
significant only for the followed citation ranking and the Chamber of 
Commerce rankings). Washington appears on all three lists. Our study 
and the Chamber of Commerce survey also overlap for Delaware, 
Washington, and Connecticut. Further, Delaware shows up high on 
both our study and the Chamber of Commerce study and not at all in 
the other lists. Both our list and the followed citation list include 
Montana, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. 
As those familiar with corporate law would predict, a “Delaware 
effect” appears. To test the Delaware effect (the hypothesis that 
Delaware’s dominance in corporate law is due in part to the quality of 
its courts), we separate out common and commercial law cases and re-
calculate our opinion quality measure.41 Appendix A reports the 
common and commercial law-only ranking.42 When we focus solely on 
common law cases, Delaware moves to a clear first place—a likely 
result of its specialization in those areas. And, of course, those are the 
areas that business lawyers likely care the most about. The foregoing 
then provides something of an explanation for why the Chamber of 
Commerce results rate Delaware so high—those being surveyed care 
disproportionately about business law. California provides an 
interesting contrast. It ranks high in a variety of areas. Even when we 
separate out the common law cases, California shows up high (second 
in the citation ranking). And that picture is quite different from the 
one that the Chamber of Commerce results portray, in which they put 
California in the bottom half of states (ranked twenty-eighth for 
judicial competence). 
At the bottom of the rankings, there is both disjunction and 
overlap. On the one hand, the Chamber of Commerce study ranks our 
best performer (California) in the bottom half of their rankings and 
one of those in our top ten (Montana) among their bottom ten. On the 
other hand, the two rankings share a number of states at the bottom 
 
 41. We define “Common and Commercial Law Cases” to include cases in the following 
subject matter areas: Contracts; Insurance; Private arbitration; Creditor v. Debtor; Lessor-
Lessee; Usury Laws; Franchise v. Franchisor; Employment Contractual Disputes; Corporate 
Law; Piercing the Corporate Veil; Tax; Bankruptcy; Enforcement of mechanics lien; Implied 
warrant of merchantability; Takings claims; Zoning issues; Property rights; Property Licensing-
Related or Permit-Related; Landlord-Tenant-Related; Federal Tort Related Act; Medical 
Malpractice; Products Liability; Wrongful Death; Libel; and other tort cases. 
 42. Appendix A also provides a ranking of judges based on common and commercial law 
productivity. Due to the relatively small number of opposing opinions available to calculate the 
independence ranking, we do not compute a separate common and commercial law 
independence ranking. 
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(including Kentucky, Hawaii, Texas (criminal law), and Louisiana). 
There is also a correspondence between our rankings and the two 
other citation-based measures with respect to a number of these low 
performers. Louisiana, for example, shows up at the bottom in all four 
rankings—in part, likely a product of the fact that it has a civil law 
system, which does not generate the kinds of opinions that other 
courts find useful in their work. 
4. Independence.  Table 6 provides data on independence. Several 
courts receive no score because of insufficient data. Rhode Island 
dominates the rankings. It is a state whose judiciary has not 
traditionally ranked high on citation counts, perhaps because of its 
small size and the presence of its dominant neighbor, Massachusetts. 
Rhode Island’s judiciary has been criticized by the Chamber of 
Commerce. Its drop in the Chamber of Commerce’s rankings on 
“legal fairness” has been the subject of radio ads run by the Chamber’s 
Institute for Legal Reform.43 Its high scores on our measures suggest at 
least the possibility that the criticisms of the Rhode Island court might 
be misplaced. That said, Rhode Island’s judiciary had some high 
profile corruption scandals in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, in 
which two chief justices were forced to resign.44 Perhaps our results 
show that the reforms instituted in 1994 were successful.45 Another 
state that also scores high, but that has not traditionally done well in 
citation studies, is Oregon. And Oregon does well on both our 
measures and those of the Chamber of Commerce. 
Table 6.  Average Independence Score 
Rank State Sel. Type Independence 
1 RI A 0.19 
2 NY A 0.15 
3 OR NE 0.13 
 
 43. Inst. for Legal Reform, ILR Advertisement, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ 
images/stories/images/ads/files/wrongwayri.mp3 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
 44. See David B. Offer, Why So Much Political Corruption in Rhode Island? But Not in 
Maine?, MORNING SENTINEL (Waterville, Me.), Mar. 13, 2007, at 5A, available at http:// 
morningsentinel.mainetoday.com/view/columns/3708052.html. 
 45. After a wave of scandals, the judicial appointments process was reformed from having 
the legislature choose supreme court justices to having the governor choose justices from a list of 
names provided by a nonpartisan commission (subject to legislative approval). See Barton P. 
Jenks, III, Rhode Island’s New Judicial Merit Selection Law, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 63, 
66–67 (1996); Michael J. Yelnosky, Rhode Island’s Judicial Nominating Commission: Can 
“Reform” Become Reality?, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 87, 88 (1996). 
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4 UT M 0.10 
5 OK_CIV M 0.09 
6 NH A 0.06 
7 TX_CIV PE 0.04 
8 OH NE 0.03 
9 MS PE 0.03 
10 IL PE 0.03 
11 AR PE 0.03 
12 WV PE 0.03 
13 AZ M 0.02 
14 NE M 0.02 
15 TN M 0.01 
16 FL M 0.01 
17 LA NE 0.01 
18 ND NE 0.01 
19 CA M 0.00 
20 SD M N/A 
21 NM PE N/A 
22 MD M N/A 
23 GA NE N/A 
24 SC A N/A 
25 MA A -0.00 
26 VT A -0.00 
27 KS M -0.01 
28 IA M -0.02 
29 WA NE -0.03 
30 PA PE -0.03 
31 TX_CRIM PE -0.03 
32 MN NE -0.04 
33 NJ A -0.04 
34 HI A -0.04 
35 KY NE -0.05 
36 NV NE -0.05 
37 MT NE -0.06 
38 ME A -0.07 
39 CO M -0.07 
40 AL PE -0.08 
41 VA A -0.08 
42 WY M -0.09 
43 AK M -0.09 
44 DE A -0.12 
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45 NC PE -0.13 
46 OK_CRIM M -0.14 
47 MO M -0.14 
48 ID NE -0.15 
49 WI NE -0.16 
50 CT A -0.18 
51 IN M -0.21 
52 MI NE -0.31 
Note: “N/A” means no score because the court lacks partisan diversity. 
Comparing our results to the Chamber of Commerce’s 2002 
survey of judicial impartiality, we see no statistically significant 
correlation between our underlying independence scores and the 
judge impartiality scores reported in the 2002 survey (correlation 
coefficient = -0.1810; not significant).46 States the Chamber of 
Commerce ranks high, like Delaware, Colorado, Wisconsin, Virginia, 
and Connecticut, show up nearer the bottom in our independence 
rankings. Table 7 shows our rankings for the top ten of the Chamber 
of Commerce survey for judicial impartiality. 
Table 7.  Comparison of Independence Rankings 











The lack of correlation may reflect the difference in 
methodologies. The Chamber of Commerce survey reveals whether 
senior lawyers at big corporations think that the courts are impartial, 
whereas we examine whether partisan considerations influence judges. 
 
 46. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, STATES LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY, 
FINAL REPORT 25 (2002). We also calculate the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient =  
-0.1576 (p-value of two-sided test of null hypothesis that the two are independent = 0.2745). 
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Suppose that Republican judges tend to favor business interests and 
that the survey respondents believe that decisions that favor business 
interests are “impartial.” If so, those lawyers would give high grades to 
courts dominated by Republican judges who vote together, whereas 
those same courts would receive low independence scores because of 
partisan voting. 
There are other possible explanations for the lack of correlation. 
The Chamber of Commerce survey asks for evaluations of the entire 
judiciary, whereas we examine the high courts. Lawyers face trial 
judges more than high court judges, and therefore their impartiality 
rankings might reflect the performance of the former rather than the 
latter. Finally, it is possible to imagine a state—take Delaware as an 
example—where all the judges may be pro–big business but may have 
strong partisan divisions on other topics. If such a state of affairs 
existed, the state could easily rank high on the Chamber of Commerce 
rankings and low on ours. 
5. Composite Measures.  There are a number of ways of 
aggregating our measures. Because the range of our productivity, 
influence, and independence measures are different, we cannot simply 
find the average of the three measures to generate a composite 
measure. Instead, for each measure (total opinions per judge-year, 
outside citations per judge-year, and independence) we computed the 
standard deviation for each state from the mean of the sample. 
Converting each measure into its standard deviation from the mean 
gives us a common metric with which to interpret each measure—a 
score of 1, for example, under the transformed measure means that 
the state is one standard deviation above the mean for the measure. 
For states without an independence score, we substituted the mean 
independence score for the other states in computing the standard 
deviation. We then combined the three standard deviation scores with 
equal weights to generate the equal-weight composite score. Table 8 
reports a composite measure that gives identical weightings to each of 
the three direct measures. 
Table 8.  Equal Weight Composite Ranking 
(All Subject Matter Areas) 
State Standard Dev. of 
Total-Opinion 
Score 
Standard Dev. of 
Outside-Citation 
Score 





CA 0.294 3.661 0.389 1.448 
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AR 2.006 0.500 0.654 1.053 
ND 1.550 1.160 0.427 1.046 
MT 1.729 1.613 -0.317 1.008 
OH 1.812 0.500 0.697 1.003 
GA 2.746 -0.138 0.009 0.872 
MS 2.016 -0.383 0.669 0.767 
PA 1.623 0.491 -0.005 0.703 
MA 0.097 1.275 0.323 0.565 
NE 0.425 0.514 0.593 0.511 
IL 0.325 0.507 0.660 0.497 
NY -0.664 0.077 1.984 0.466 
WA -0.384 1.530 0.043 0.396 
MD -0.124 1.270 0.009 0.385 
RI -0.587 -0.806 2.525 0.377 
KS -0.188 0.933 0.209 0.318 
AL 1.824 -0.431 -0.587 0.269 
NH -0.311 -0.002 0.992 0.226 
TN -0.162 0.335 0.488 0.220 
FL 0.705 -0.597 0.456 0.188 
WV -0.183 0.086 0.652 0.185 
UT -0.047 -0.958 1.437 0.144 
IA 0.022 0.204 0.138 0.122 
SC -0.090 0.368 0.009 0.096 
WY 0.935 -0.175 -0.656 0.035 
SD -0.072 -0.033 0.009 -0.032 
VT -0.581 0.086 0.313 -0.061 
NJ -0.942 0.769 -0.074 -0.082 
AK -0.041 0.342 -0.690 -0.129 
IN 1.074 0.539 -2.041 -0.143 
CT 0.454 0.778 -1.670 -0.146 
DE -1.196 1.633 -0.987 -0.183 
OR -1.129 -1.200 1.757 -0.191 
CO -0.705 0.600 -0.474 -0.193 
MN -0.534 0.023 -0.071 -0.194 
AZ -1.146 -0.140 0.620 -0.222 
ME 0.195 -0.415 -0.465 -0.228 
OK_CIV -0.808 -1.345 1.315 -0.279 
TX_CIV -1.031 -0.758 0.818 -0.324 
LA -0.282 -1.182 0.438 -0.342 
VA -0.465 -0.146 -0.600 -0.404 
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ID 0.377 -0.714 -1.346 -0.561 
TX_CRIM -0.236 -1.644 -0.012 -0.631 
NM -1.262 -0.663 0.009 -0.639 
KY -0.547 -1.188 -0.193 -0.643 
NV -0.903 -0.808 -0.248 -0.653 
HI -1.060 -0.877 -0.092 -0.676 
WI -0.572 -0.189 -1.423 -0.728 
NC -1.152 -1.046 -1.139 -1.112 
MO -1.147 -1.432 -1.226 -1.268 
OK_CRI
M 
-0.905 -1.707 -1.223 -1.278 
MI -0.752 -0.818 -3.102 -1.557 
Note: For each measure (total opinions per judge-year, outside citations per judge-year, and 
independence) we computed the standard deviation from the mean of the sample for each state. 
For those states without an independence score, we substituted the mean independence score for 
the other states in computing the standard deviation. We then combined the three standard 
deviation scores with equal weights to generate the equal-weighted composite score. 
California comes out at the top, as it has in other academic studies. 
More surprisingly, Arkansas and North Dakota, not traditional 
powerhouses, come in second and third. 
However, there is no reason to think that each measure should 
receive equal weighting. Table 9 provides a triangle chart that varies 
the weight given to each of the three different measures. At each apex, 
the measure in bracket is given sole weight and the other measures are 
given zero. Between the apexes, the measures are given the weights in 
parentheses (in the order of quality, productivity, independence). For 
example, if one gives equal weight to productivity and independence, 
and no weight to influence, then the top five states are Georgia, 
Mississippi, Arkansas, Ohio, and North Dakota.47 
 
 47. Weighting choices matter more for the independence measure, which is uncorrelated 
with influence and productivity; influence and productivity have a correlation coefficient of 0.3. 
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Table 9.  Linear Combinations of Influence, Productivity, and 
Independence for All Subject Matter Areas (Productivity, Opinion 
Quality, Independence) 
                                                                          [Productivity] 
                                                                          GA, MS, AR, 
                                                                          AL, OH 
                                                                          (1,0,0) 
                                            GA, MT, AR,                               GA, MS, AR, 
                                            OH, ND                                         OH, ND 
                                            (.75,.25,0)                                       (.75,0,.25) 
                                                                          GA, AR, OH, 
                                                                          MS, MT 
                     CA, MT, ND,                             (.67,.16,.16)                           GA, MS, AR, 
                     GA, AR                                                                                     OH, ND 
                     (.5,.5,0)                                                                                       (.5,0,.5) 
                                           CA, MT, ND,                                  AR, GA, OH, 
                                           AR, GA                                           MS, ND 
                                           (.42,.42,.16)          CA, AR, ND,   (.42,.16,.42) 
                                                                         MT, OH 
          CA, MT, ND,                                       (.33,.33,.33)                                            RI, NY, UT, 
          WA, MA                 CA, MT, ND,                                          RI, NY, CA,     OR, MS 
          (.25,.75,0)                 WA, MA                                                 AR, OH            (.25,0,.75) 
                                            (.16,.67,.16)          CA, ND, MT,           (.16,.16,.67) 
                                                                          AR, OH 
                                                                          (.16,.42,.42) 
CA, DE, MT,          CA, WA, MT,                 CA, NY, RI             RI, NY, CA,       RI, NY, OR 
WA, MA                 MA, DE                         MA, ND                    OR, UT              UT, OK_CIV 
(0,1,0)                       (0,.75,.25)                       (0,.5,.5)                      (0,.25,.75)           (0,0,1) 
[Opinion Quality]                                                                                                      [Independence] 
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Table 10.  Top Ranking States (From Table 9) 
State Number of #1 
Rankings 
Number of #1 to 
#3 Rankings 





(Number of #1 
to #3 Rankings) 
AR 1 7 11 5 
CA 9 11 11 5 
ND 0 6 11 0 
MT 0 8 10 1 
OH 0 2 9 0 
GA 5 6 8 0 
MS 0 3 6 9 
MA 0 0 5 0 
NY 0 5 5 8 
RI 4 5 5 7 
WA 0 1 4 0 
OR 0 1 3 2 
UT 0 1 3 4 
DE 0 1 2 4 
AL 0 0 1 11 
OK_CIV 0 0 1 0 
MD 0 0 0 1 
No state emerges as a clear winner, but a strong case can be made 
that California has the best high court. It has the most number 1 
rankings on the triangle chart, and the most number 1 to 3 rankings, 
and is tied for the most number 1 to 5 rankings. (See Table 10.) The 
top contenders are Arkansas, North Dakota, Montana, and Georgia. 
If one focuses on common and commercial law cases only, where 
arguably state-specific factors should play the smallest role, then 
Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, and Alabama emerge as the top 
states (see Appendix A for composite rankings based on common and 
commercial law case productivity and opinion quality rankings). 
Compare our overall composite rankings with the three most 
recent studies, the 2000 Comparato study, the followed case measures 
drawn from the 2007 Dear and Jessen data, and the 2002 Chamber of 
Commerce survey (overall rankings). 
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Table 11.  Comparison of Rankings of Courts 




Citation Ranking  
1998–2000 
Followed Citations 
2002 Chamber of 
Commerce Survey—
Overall Score 
Arkansas California California Delaware 
California New York Washington Virginia 
North Dakota Minnesota Nebraska Washington 
Montana Pennsylvania Kansas Kansas 
Ohio Colorado Massachusetts Iowa 
Georgia Michigan Connecticut Nebraska 
Mississippi Washington Montana Colorado 
Massachusetts Illinois Iowa Utah 
Rhode Island New Jersey Maryland South Dakota 
New York Wisconsin Texas Connecticut 




and the underlying 
score for each 
ranking 0.139 0.673 -0.158 
p-value* 0.335 0.000 0.275 
    
Spearman rank 
coeff. between our 
composite result 
ranking and each 
ranking 0.030 0.629 -0.132 
p-value** 0.835 0.000 0.362 
Our equally weighted composite measure is not correlated with 
the Comparato or Chamber of Commerce rankings. If anything, our 
rankings are negatively correlated with the Chamber of Commerce 
rankings. Only the followed citation rankings are positively correlated 
with our composite measure. 
Further, several southern states—Arkansas, Georgia, and 
Mississippi—appear on the top ten list. Perhaps judges sitting on the 
high courts of these states think of their judicial role more in terms of 
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deciding disputes and less in terms of crafting high-quality opinions.48 
An alternative view is that cultural differences between southern and 
non-southern states are great enough that courts do not cite courts 
from the other region as much as they cite courts from their own 
region, in which case the greater number of northern states produces a 
bias in the citation measure. If so, the prior citation studies have 
undervalued the courts of the southern states. 
As discussed in a prior article, elected judges tend to publish 
more opinions, whereas appointed judges tend to publish more-cited 
opinions.49 The influence of the selection system, then, might also 
explain why southern states—where electoral systems are more 
common—do well under our composite measure. Different states, as a 
function of their selection systems, appear to focus on different aspects 
of the judicial task. Citations capture but an aspect of that, as do 
surveys of corporate lawyers. Our goal is to improve on the existing 
rankings by providing a broader set of measures than prior rankings. 
Broadening the measures enables us to capture more aspects of the 
job than the prior rankings have. 
D. Digging Deeper: Ranking Courts while Controlling for State-
Specific Factors 
An objection to our rankings may be that we do not control for 
state-specific factors. Suppose, for example, that the Montana high 
court is more productive than the California high court (both in the 
aggregate and per judge) because cases in Montana are simpler. 
Montana is a less populous, less commercially complex, and more 
homogenous state, and it is possible that in such states courts can 
resolve cases quickly. Controlling for the complexity of the legal 
environment, it might turn out that the California court is in fact more 
productive than the Montana court. 
To control for state-specific factors, we computed what we call 
“abnormal” rankings. For each of our three measures of performance, 
we estimated an ordinary least squares model using the performance 
measure as the dependent variable and state-level controls for the age 
of the state, the log of the population, the log of the aggregate 
population of neighboring states, the state’s crime rate, the median age 
of the population, the log of the gross state product, the state’s median 
 
 48. Cf. Choi et al., supra note 6 (manuscript at 41). 
 49. Id. 
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income level for 1997, the fraction of the population that is African 
American, and a measure of citizen ideology for the state based on 
election results in each district which are used to compute a statewide 
average (ultimately based on interest group ratings of a given state’s 
federal congressional delegation) (termed the Citizen Ideology 
Score).50 (Variable definitions are in Appendix D.) We computed 
predicted scores for each measure using the model and then calculated 
the difference between the actual and predicted scores. This difference 
is the abnormal score for the performance measure. If the residual is 
positive, the state is outperforming its predictors. And if the residual is 
negative, the state is underperforming its predictors. The details of our 
computation method and the abnormal rankings for each of the three 
performance measures are in Appendix B. Table 12 displays the 
triangle diagram for our composite measure. 
 
 50. The data are from William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology 
in the American States, 1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 330–31 (1998). Updated data are 
available at State Citizen and Government Ideology, http://www.uky.edu/%7Erford/ 
Home_files/page0005.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
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Table 12.  Linear Combinations of Influence, Productivity, and 
Independence for All Subject Matter Areas Using Abnormal 
Rankings (Productivity, Opinion Quality, Independence) 
[Productivity] 
                                                                         GA, OH, AR, 
                                                                         PA, MT 
                                                                         (1,0,0) 
  
                                             GA, OH, AR,                            GA, OH, AR, 
                                             MT, PA                                       PA, ND 
                                             (.75,.25,0)                                    (.75,0,.25) 
                                                                        GA, OH, AR, 
                                                                        MT, PA 
                      CA, MT, AR,                          (.67,.16,.16)                            GA, OH, AR, 
                      GA, OH                                                                                   PA, NE 
                      (.5,.5,0)                                                                                     (.5,0,.5) 
                                           CA, MT, AR,                                 OH, GA, AR, 
                                           GA, OH                                          PA, CA 
                                           (.42,.42,.16)        CA, AR, OH,    (.42,.16,.42) 
                                                                       MT, GA 
        CA, MT, AR,                                      (.33,.33,.33)                               NY, OK_CIV, OR, 
        ND, WA          CA, MT, AR,                         NY, OK_CIV, NH,    NH, RI 
        (.25,.75,0)        WA, ND                                  NE, OH                       (.25,0,.75) 
                                  (.16,.67,.16)  CA, AR, MT,  (.16,.16,.67) 
                                                         OH, NE 
                                                        (.16,.42,.42) 
 
CA, MT, DE,          CA, MT, WA,        CA, KS, NE     NY, OK_CIV, NH,  OK_CIV, NY, NH 
WA, AR                  KS, AR                    WA, AR          CA, NE                      RI, OR 
(0,1,0)                   (0,.75,.25)                 (0,.5,.5)             (0,.25,.75)                   (0,0,1) 
[Opinion Quality]                                                                                                      [Independence] 
 We did not control for state court characteristics (such as judge 
selection system, number of clerks, presence of an intermediate 
appellate court, and so on) in our abnormal rankings. We treated 
these variables, unlike the state-specific factors, as part of the choice 
set available to a state when designing its state court system. The 
abnormal rankings therefore give a measure of how well a state is 
doing based on its own court system–related choices while controlling 
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for factors out of the control of a state-level decisionmaker (such as 
state population). 
Table 12 reveals that the composite results do not differ much 
from our “normal” rankings, and the correlation coefficients for each 
of the rankings are high (correlation coefficient = 0.8548; significant at 
the <1 percent level) (see Appendix B). California has the highest 
number of number one rankings under both our original composite 
rankings (in Table 9) and our abnormal composite rankings in Table 
12. 
E. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce Study: Some Observations 
Why do the Chamber of Commerce’s surveys differ from our 
results? The methodologies are different, of course. Our study 
measures productivity, influence and quality, and independence. The 
Chamber of Commerce surveys senior lawyers at corporations that 
have annual revenues of at least $100 million. A problem with the 
Chamber of Commerce survey is that the attitudes of business lawyers 
probably tell us more about the value of a judicial system for business 
than about its overall quality.51 Plus the Chamber of Commerce is 
hardly a neutral organization; it is a lobbying group that even becomes 
involved in individual elections, spending large sums attacking and 
supporting different candidates.52 Still, our methodology has problems 
as well; the relevant question is which methodology is more accurate? 
To probe the differences between methodologies, we ran 
regressions of the Chamber of Commerce 2002 overall scores (CC 
Score) and rankings (CC Rank) on various state and court variables to 
see whether we could predict a significant portion of the Chamber’s 
rankings using variables proxying for political affiliation or 
conservative bias. 
We used an ordinary least squares model where the dependent 
variable is the Chamber of Commerce overall score for a state and an 
ordered logit when the dependent variable is the ordinal overall rank. 
We included a set of independent variables to assess the importance of 
politics in the ranking: Republican Governor (defined to equal 1 if the 
governor is Republican and 0 otherwise); Legis. Republican (defined 
 
 51. For related criticisms of U.S. Chamber of Commerce studies, see Elizabeth G. 
Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West 
Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097, 1100–07 (2008). 
 52. See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Report: Spending on Judicial Elections Soaring, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO, May 18, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10253213. 
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to equal 1 if the legislature is controlled by Republicans); and Legis. 
Democrat (defined to equal 1 if the legislature is controlled by 
Democrats). We used legislatures with split control between 
Democrats and Republicans as the base category for Legis. 
Republican and Legis. Democrat. We also included a variable, 
Common Law, defined as the number of property, torts, and 
commercial law opinions divided by all opinions for a particular state 
from 1998 to 2000. The Chamber of Commerce survey may look more 
favorably on states that focus their attention on private law issues 
important to the business constituency of the Chamber. For state-level 
independent variables, we used the same variables we used in our 
abnormal performance model discussed above. 
We also added a number of court-level independent variables. 
We included an indicator variable for whether the state selects high 
court judges through partisan election, nonpartisan election, or merit 
selection (with appointment states as the base category). We included 
measures for the average high court associate justice salary (Adjusted 
Associate Justice Salary) and the average partner salary in the state 
(Adjusted Partner Salary). The salary variables were adjusted for the 
cost of living for the metro area in which the high court is located. We 
included an indicator variable for whether the judges on the high court 
remained the same throughout our sample time period from 1998 to 
2000 (Stable Court) and the size of the bench during the 1998 to 2000 
period (Number of Active Judges on Bench). We included an indicator 
variable for whether the judges in a specific court do not face 
mandatory retirement (No Mandatory Retirement). As a measure of 
resources available to high court judges, we included the average 
number of clerks per judge for the 1998 to 2000 period (Number of 
Clerks per Judge) and an indicator variable for whether the clerks are 
tenured for at least one year (Long-Term Clerk). To capture the 
opportunity cost of being a law clerk, the difference between the 
average salary of an entering associate at law firm in that state and the 
law clerk salary was used (Law Clerk Opportunity Cost). We included 
the log of the number of trial cases in the state measured in 1998 
(ln(Number of Trial Cases in the State)) and an indicator variable for 
the presence of an intermediate appellate court (Intermediate 
Appellate Court). Specific court rules may affect the workload that 
judges face, affecting the level of judicial output. We lastly included an 
indicator variable for whether judges face a mandatory publication 
rule (Mandatory Publication). (Variable definitions are in Appendix 
D.) Table 13 provides the results. 
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Table 13.  Chamber of Commerce Models 










Dependent Variable CC Score CC Score CC Rank CC Rank 
Independent Variables     
Republican Governor 0.005 0.051 -0.223 -0.249 
 (0.06) (0.33) (-0.36) (-0.22) 
Legis. Republican 0.030 -0.018 0.334 -0.031 
 (0.28) (-0.17) (0.45) (-0.03) 
Legis. Democrat -0.216** -0.037 1.591** 0.345 
 (-2.14) (-0.24) (2.22) (0.27) 
Common Law 0.487 1.164*** -6.720** -20.279*** 
 (0.89) (3.10) (-2.17) (-4.54) 
State Age 0.004* 0.005** -0.015 -0.043** 
 (1.77) (2.54) (-1.26) (-2.47) 
ln(State Population) -0.833 -0.801* 5.281 11.941** 
 (-1.68) (-2.03) (1.61) (2.39) 
ln(Pop. in Border States) 0.075 -0.045 -0.739* -0.505 
 (1.18) (-0.63) (-1.76) (-0.74) 
Crime Index 0.000** 0.000** -0.001* -0.001** 
 (2.10) (2.16) (-1.94) (-2.49) 
Median Age of Population 0.012 0.026 -0.159 -0.272 
 (0.48) (1.03) (-0.95) (-1.15) 
ln(Gross State Product) 0.754 0.726** -4.712 -11.435** 
 (1.53) (2.15) (-1.46) (-2.47) 
State Median Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.70) (1.17) (-1.3) (-1.58) 
Black Population  Fraction -2.477** -2.664*** 14.197** 34.060*** 
 (-2.47) (-3.31) (2.38) (3.48) 
Citizen Ideology Score -0.004 -0.004 0.058* 0.082* 
 (-0.81) (-1.02) (1.83) (1.78) 
Election Partisan  0.098  -0.237 
  (0.51)  (-0.17) 
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Election Nonpartisan  0.238*  -1.828 
  (1.79)  (-1.21) 
Merit Plan  0.199  -3.388** 
  (1.51)  (-2.40) 
Adj. Associate Justice Salary  0.000  0.003 
  (-0.19)  (0.67) 
Adjusted Partner Salary  0.000  -0.002* 
  (1.40)  (-1.73) 
Stable Court  -0.058  -1.075 
  (-0.65)  (-0.99) 
Number of Active Judges  -0.083***  0.857** 
  (-2.87)  (2.07) 
No Mandatory Retirement  0.126  -1.826 
  (1.10)  (-1.41) 
Long-Term Clerk  0.012  0.262 
  (0.14)  (0.34) 
Number of Clerks per Judge  -0.262***  3.764*** 
  (-3.83)  (4.51) 
Law Clerk Opportunity Cost  -0.004*  0.068** 
  (-2.07)  (2.56) 
ln(Trial Cases in the State)  0.162**  -2.198** 
  (2.68)  (-2.52) 
Intermediate Appellate  0.094  -0.444 
  (0.42)  (-0.24) 
Mandatory Publication  -0.002  -1.092 
  (-0.02)  (-0.99) 
Constant -7.360 -9.139**   
 (-1.66) (-2.52)   
N 50 49 50 49 
Adjusted R2 or Pseudo R2 0.487 0.721 0.113 0.278 
The significance levels for the coefficients are as follows: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** <1% level. 
Models 1 and 2 use the raw Chamber of Commerce score (from 0 
to 4, best), while Models 3 and 4 use the Chamber of Commerce 
ranking (from 1, best, to 50). Because high scores are good and low 
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ranks are bad, the coefficients should have opposite signs (and they 
do). Models 1 and 3 control for state-specific factors only; Models 2 
and 4 control for court-specific factors as well. 
The following types of states do worse in Chamber of Commerce 
surveys: those with Democratic legislatures (in Models 1 and 3);53 
those with fewer common law cases (as a proportion of all cases); 
younger states; more populous states; poorer states; states with larger 
African-American populations; and states with more liberal 
populations (in Models 3 and 4). As for institutional factors, states 
with more judges who are active on the bench do worse; so do states 
with more law clerks, and so do states with fewer trials.54 
It is not surprising that business lawyers do not like the judicial 
systems in more liberal and poorer states.55 Most likely, in these states 
populist tendencies affect the performance of judges or result in the 
appointment or election of judges who place less weight on the 
interests of large businesses than judges in more conservative, 
commercial, or wealthier states. 
III.  COURTS OR JUDGES? 
As argued above, ranking courts is a necessary, even if difficult, 
exercise. Courts perform important public functions and there is good 
reason to believe that the institutional design of courts can contribute 
to the quality of their work. Consider, by way of comparison, efforts to 
identify municipal police departments that successfully reduce crime. 
Admired police departments are identified, and then other police 
departments send representatives to learn about the factors that 
contribute to success. Similarly, judiciaries ought to pay attention to 
 
 53. Democratic legislatures do worse compared with the base category of split legislatures in 
Models 1 and 3. The coefficient on Legis. Democrat loses significance, however, once state court–
level controls are added. In addition, the difference between Legis. Democrat and Legis. 
Republican is significant at the 10 percent level for Model 1 (although the difference is 
insignificant in the other models). 
 54. A study by Professors Russell Sobel and Joshua Hall, Sobel & Hall, supra note 27, at 75, 
runs a similar regression but finds that states with electoral systems have the lowest Chamber of 
Commerce ratings. We suspect that our inclusion of a number of control variables that are 
correlated with the type of selection system explains the difference (they also used Chamber of 
Commerce ratings from 2004, whereas we used 2002 ratings). They also found that Republican-
controlled state supreme courts during their period had a higher judicial quality rating than 
Democratic-controlled state supreme courts. Id. at 77. 
 55. We also checked whether the partisan composition of the bench affected Chamber of 
Commerce scores. A variable equal to the fraction of Republican judges is not significantly 
different from zero for all four of the models in Table 13: Chamber of Commerce Models. 
CGP IN FINAL 5/5/2009 4:03:09 PM 
2009] RANKING STATE HIGH COURTS 1359 
what other judiciaries do, and the best courts probably have something 
to teach less successful courts. 
The question arises whether state judges should be ranked as 
well. Prior work has ranked federal judges.56 Care should be taken in 
interpreting such rankings. People who read rankings often mistakenly 
assume that rankings reflect uniform quality differences, when in fact 
they do not. On the other hand, where a judge consistently scores at 
the bottom of objective rankings, those reviewing the judge’s 
performance (whether for promotion to a higher judgeship or for re-
election in a state with judicial elections) may wish to probe further to 
see if the judge’s poor ranking correlates with general poor judicial 
performance. 
Using our objective metrics, we identify the top judges using our 
composite ranking methodology. We urge scholars to take a look at 
their opinions and see whether these opinions stand out for their 
quality or independence. Table 14 provides our triangle diagram. One 
objection to the results in Table 14 is that it likely overweighs the 
importance of the numerous short dissents and concurrences that 
judges in certain states wrote during the period of our study. Hence, 
some cantankerous judges might do especially well. As an alternative, 
Appendix C reports the triangle using published majority opinions 
instead of total published opinions. 
 
 56. E.g., Landes et al., supra note 5, at 271. 
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Table 14.  Judge Ranking: Linear Combinations of Influence, 
Productivity, and Independence for All Subject Matter Areas 
(Productivity, Opinion Quality, Independence) 
[Productivity] 
     Berdon† [CT] 
                                                                        McRae [MS] 
                                                                        Johnstone [AL] 
                                                                        (1,0,0) 
                                              Berdon† [CT]                                  Berdon† [CT] 
                                              McRae [MS]                                    McRae [MS] 
                                              Stratton [OH]                                 Stratton [OH] 
                                              (.75,.25,0)                                         (.75,0,.25) 
                                                                        Berdon† [CT] 
                                                                        Stratton [OH] 
                                                                        McRae [MS] 
                      Brown [CA]                            (.67,.16,.16)                                     Berdon† [CT] 
                      Boehm [IN]                                                                                      Maddox† [AL] 
                       Stratton [OH]                                                                                  Stratton [OH] 
                       (.5,.5,0)                                                                                              (.5,0,.5) 
                                             Brown [CA]                                     Stratton [OH] 
                                             Stratton [OH]                                  Berdon† [CT] 
                                             Boehm [XX]                                    Maddox† [AL] 
                                             (.42,.42,.16)                                       (.42,.16,.42) 
                                                                         Stratton [OH] 
                                                                         Brown [CA] 
                                                                         Nelson [MT] 
          Brown [CA]                                         (.33,.33,.33)                                          Walsh [DE] 
          Baxter [CA]                                                                                                       Leeson [OR] 
          Greaney [MA]         Brown [CA]                                      Walsh [DE]         Ciparick [NY] 
          (.25,.75,0)                 Baxter [CA]                                       Ciparick [NY]     (.25,0,.75) 
                                            Greaney [MA]                                  Leeson [OR] 
                                             (.16,.67,.16)       Walsh [DE]           (.16,.16,.67) 
                                                                        Brown [AR] 
                                                                        Baxter [CA] 
                                                                        (.16,.42,.42) 
Brown [CA]           Brown [CA]                 Walsh [DE]            Walsh [DE]            Walsh [DE] 
Baxter [CA]            Baxter [CA]                 Brown [AR]           Ciparick [NY]         Leeson [OR] 
Johnson [WA]        Greaney [MA]             Baxter [CA]            Leeson [OR]         Ciparick[NY] 
(0,1,0)                    (0,.75,.25)                     (0,.5,.5)                    (0,.25,.75)                (0,0,1) 
[Opinion Quality]                                                                                                      [Independence] 
†Judge retired prior to 2002. 
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We also ran regressions to identify factors that may contribute to 
individual judicial quality. We ran ordinary least squares regressions 
with the log of the total number of opinions authored (Opinions 
Model), the log of 1 + the number of outside state citations (Citations 
Model) as dependent variables (both on judge-year-level data). We 
also estimated an ordinary least squares regression with our 
independence measure as the dependent variable for judge-level data 
(Independence Model). For all three models, we used as independent 
variables several judge-characteristic variables, including whether a 
judge is the chief judge (Chief Judge), the number of years the judge 
sat on the court (Yrs. Court Experience), the number of years since the 
judge graduated from law school (Yrs. Legal Experience), whether the 
judge retired prior to 2002 (Retired before 2002), the age of the judge 
(Age), the gender of the judge (Female), whether the judge was 
engaged in private practice prior to becoming a judge (Private Prac. 
Exp.), whether the judge made election-related expenditures in the 
year in question, an ideology score for the judge developed by Brace, 
Hall & Langer (ranging from 0=more conservative to 1=more liberal) 
(Judge Ideology),57 the U.S. News ranking of the judge’s law school 
measured as of 2005 (U.S. News Law School Ranking), and whether 
the judge attended an in-state law school (Attended In-State Law 
School). (Variable definitions are in Appendix D.) Table 15 provides 
our results. 
Table 15.  State-Fixed Effects Model 
(Judge-Year Data) 
 Opinions Citations Independence 
Chief Judge -0.167*** -0.094 -0.008 
Yrs. Court Experience 0.016*** 0.011* 0.003 
Yrs. Legal Experience -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 
Retired before 2002 -0.168*** -0.130* 0.035 
Age 0.004 0.005 0.000 
Female -0.052 -0.070 0.090*** 
Private Prac. Exp. -0.025 0.061 -0.042 
Election Spending 0.021 0.021  
 
 57. See Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the Preferences of State 
Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387, 393–98 (2000). 
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Judge Ideology  0.002 0.002 0.001 
U.S. News Law School Ranking 0.001 0.000 -0.001* 
Attended In-State Law School -0.063 0.062 0.061 
1999 Case -0.084 -0.132*  
2000 Case -0.039 -0.281***  
State-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 1007 999 329 
R2 0.38 0.24 0.15 
The significance levels for the coefficients are as follows: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** <1% level. 
Note: The opinions variable is the natural log of total opinions; the citations variable is the 
natural log of the total outside citations to all majority opinions authored by a particular judge 
for a specific year. South Dakota, New Mexico, Maryland, Georgia, and South Carolina judges 
are dropped from the independence regressions because of lack of party variation in those states. 
We used fixed effects for the states, so the regression captured the 
effect of judge-specific characteristics, such as where a judge went to 
law school, on the outcomes. The model shows that chief judges write 
fewer opinions, no doubt because they have administrative 
responsibilities. Also not surprisingly, judges with more experience on 
the bench write more opinions and opinions that are cited more often. 
Judges approaching retirement slow down and write fewer opinions, 
but not worse opinions. Surprisingly, age, years of legal experience, 
private practice experience, law school ranking, and political ideology 
have little effect on any of the measures. We do find that female 
judges are significantly more independent than their male 
counterparts.58 
We also ran the regression using the composite measure as the 
dependent variable; none of the independent variables was statistically 
significant. 
 
 58. Putting aside the findings with respect to gender effects, our results overall are similar to 
those of the Landes et al. study on federal circuit judges, although they have some different 
variables in their regressions. They find that judges who graduate from Harvard and Yale Law 
Schools are cited more often than other judges, but these results are weak and do not hold for 
top-twenty law schools, and that race, sex, measures of academic achievement, prior experience, 
ideology, and ABA ratings are mostly insignificant. Landes et al., supra note 5, at 324–25. 
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CONCLUSION 
Many people are uncomfortable with rankings. They argue that 
rankings unavoidably disregard important aspects of the ranked 
institution’s performance and encourage people to compete with 
respect to only measurable aspects of performance. Competitions to 
perform well on rankings then prompt a downward spiral as 
institutions neglect important but hard-to-measure aspects of their 
missions to improve their rank. 
We agree that rankings can be misused, but as far as state courts 
are concerned, the genie is out of the bottle. Not only do annual 
rankings of state courts such as the Chamber of Commerce survey 
exist, but there are at least two websites that enable the aggregation of 
public ratings of judges. 
We have presented our rankings cautiously, recognizing that 
readers will weight aspects of judicial performance differently. We 
urge readers to treat the rankings as an information-forcing device. 
Assume that a low ranking creates a prima facie case that a state high 
court is low quality, but allow its defenders to advance arguments why 
special circumstances may account for the court’s performance. If the 
explanations ring false in light of objective metrics of judicial 
performance, such as those we advance in this Article, then it might be 
a good idea to urge reform (or at least seek further justification for 
why a low ranking court is in fact performing well). And courts, other 
scholars, and other interested parties, we hope, will develop their own 
rankings. Competition to develop rankings will lead to greater 
information about courts. Competition will also help uncover hidden 
criteria used in currently non-transparent rankings, such as the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce rankings, and encourage research into 
difficult-to-measure aspects of performance. Concern about difficult-
to-measure aspects of performance should encourage researchers to 
develop new measurement instruments, such as surveys that are 
distributed to a more representative sample of the population than 
those financed by the Chamber of Commerce. If multiple rankings 
converge, then the case for reform of state high courts that repeatedly 
appear at the bottom will be strengthened. 
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APPENDIX A: COMMON LAW AREAS ONLY 
Number of Opinions (Common and Commercial Law Areas Only) 
State Sel. System Opinions Judge-Years Opinions/ 
Judge-Year 
AL PE 860 30 28.667 
MS PE 502 29 17.310 
AR PE 304 21 14.476 
MT NE 289 21 13.762 
PA PE 284 21 13.524 
GA NE 282 21 13.429 
ID NE 214 16 13.375 
OH NE 276 21 13.143 
ME A 340 26 13.077 
UT M 211 17 12.412 
NE M 266 23 11.565 
VA A 236 21 11.238 
ND NE 170 16 10.625 
WY M 158 15 10.533 
SD M 153 15 10.200 
AK M 157 18 8.722 
CT A 199 23 8.652 
IA M 232 28 8.286 
TX_CIV PE 211 27 7.815 
LA NE 183 24 7.625 
MD M 166 22 7.545 
WI NE 157 21 7.476 
RI A 112 15 7.467 
NY A 159 22 7.227 
CA M 150 21 7.143 
NH A 120 17 7.059 
MI NE 166 24 6.917 
WV PE 102 15 6.800 
IN M 99 15 6.600 
IL PE 143 22 6.500 
WA NE 180 28 6.429 
VT A 96 15 6.400 
OK_CIV M 179 28 6.393 
KS M 132 21 6.286 
MN NE 150 24 6.250 
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SC A 90 16 5.625 
FL M 112 21 5.333 
KY NE 111 22 5.045 
CO M 115 23 5.000 
MA A 114 23 4.957 
MO M 103 22 4.682 
HI A 83 18 4.611 
NJ A 121 27 4.481 
TN M 69 16 4.313 
DE A 61 15 4.067 
OR NE 77 21 3.667 
NC PE 84 23 3.652 
NV NE 59 18 3.278 
NM PE 35 15 2.333 
AZ M 29 15 1.933 
We define “Common and Commercial Law Cases” to include cases in the following subject 
matter areas: Contracts; Insurance; Private arbitration; Creditor v. Debtor; Lessor-Lessee; Usury 
Laws; Franchise v. Franchisor; Employment Contractual Disputes; Corporate Law; Piercing the 
Corporate Veil; Tax; Bankruptcy; Enforcement of mechanics lien; Implied warrant of 
merchantability; Takings claims; Zoning issues; Property rights; Property Licensing-Related or 
Permit-Related; Landlord-Tenant-Related; Federal Tort Related Act; Medical Malpractice; 
Products Liability; Wrongful Death; Libel; and other tort cases. 
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Out-of-State Citations to Majority Opinions (Common and 
Commercial Law Areas Only) 
State Sel. System Citations Judge-Years Citations/ 
Judge-Year 
DE A 246 15 16.400 
CA M 247 21 11.762 
MD M 205 22 9.318 
WA NE 237 28 8.464 
MT NE 170 21 8.095 
NY A 175 22 7.955 
AL PE 237 30 7.900 
VA A 163 21 7.762 
NJ A 205 27 7.593 
ND NE 119 16 7.438 
IA M 188 28 6.714 
CT A 153 23 6.652 
CO M 151 23 6.565 
TX_CIV PE 176 27 6.519 
IL PE 138 22 6.273 
OH NE 130 21 6.190 
WV PE 92 15 6.133 
PA PE 126 21 6.000 
KS M 125 21 5.952 
IN M 89 15 5.933 
AR PE 120 21 5.714 
MA A 131 23 5.696 
AK M 101 18 5.611 
SD M 81 15 5.400 
SC A 84 16 5.250 
ME A 134 26 5.154 
MN NE 123 24 5.125 
WI NE 104 21 4.952 
TN M 77 16 4.813 
NE M 110 23 4.783 
FL M 98 21 4.667 
WY M 69 15 4.600 
MS PE 131 29 4.517 
UT M 74 17 4.353 
ID NE 67 16 4.188 
MI NE 99 24 4.125 
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HI A 74 18 4.111 
RI A 61 15 4.067 
VT A 57 15 3.800 
NH A 62 17 3.647 
AZ M 52 15 3.467 
NM PE 49 15 3.267 
OR NE 68 21 3.238 
NV NE 58 18 3.222 
GA NE 65 21 3.095 
OK_CIV M 84 28 3.000 
NC PE 65 23 2.826 
LA NE 59 24 2.458 
MO M 51 22 2.318 
KY NE 37 22 1.682 
We define “Common and Commercial Law Cases” to include cases in the following subject 
matter areas: Contracts; Insurance; Private arbitration; Creditor v. Debtor; Lessor-Lessee; Usury 
Laws; Franchise v. Franchisor; Employment Contractual Disputes; Corporate Law; Piercing the 
Corporate Veil; Tax; Bankruptcy; Enforcement of mechanics lien; Implied warrant of 
merchantability; Takings claims; Zoning issues; Property rights; Property Licensing-Related or 
Permit-Related; Landlord-Tenant-Related; Federal Tort Related Act; Medical Malpractice; 
Products Liability; Wrongful Death; Libel; and other tort cases. 
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Common and Commercial Law–Only Equal-Weight Composite 
Ranking 
State Standard Dev. of 
Total-Opinion 
Score 








AL 4.417 1.417 -0.608 1.742 
MS 1.957 0.810 0.641 1.136 
NY -0.228 1.427 1.950 1.050 
UT 0.895 0.781 1.406 1.027 
RI -0.176 0.730 2.489 1.014 
AR 1.343 1.025 0.626 0.998 
OH 1.054 1.110 0.670 0.945 
MT 1.188 1.452 -0.340 0.766 
ND 0.508 1.334 0.400 0.748 
CA -0.246 2.110 0.363 0.742 
PA 1.136 1.076 -0.030 0.728 
NE 0.712 0.858 0.565 0.712 
TX_CIV -0.100 1.169 0.789 0.619 
GA 1.116 0.555 -0.016 0.552 
MD -0.159 1.672 -0.016 0.499 
ME 1.040 0.925 -0.487 0.492 
OK_CIV -0.408 0.538 1.284 0.471 
VA 0.641 1.392 -0.622 0.471 
WV -0.320 1.100 0.625 0.468 
IL -0.385 1.125 0.632 0.457 
SD 0.416 0.969 -0.016 0.456 
NH -0.264 0.654 0.963 0.451 
IA 0.002 1.204 0.113 0.440 
OR -0.999 0.581 1.724 0.435 
WA -0.401 1.518 0.018 0.379 
DE -0.912 2.942 -1.007 0.341 
KS -0.432 1.068 0.183 0.273 
LA -0.141 0.441 0.411 0.237 
WY 0.489 0.825 -0.678 0.212 
FL -0.638 0.837 0.429 0.209 
MA -0.720 1.022 0.297 0.200 
VT -0.407 0.682 0.287 0.187 
ID 1.104 0.751 -1.364 0.164 
TN -0.859 0.863 0.461 0.155 
NJ -0.822 1.362 -0.098 0.147 
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AK 0.096 1.007 -0.711 0.131 
MN -0.439 0.919 -0.095 0.128 
SC -0.575 0.942 -0.016 0.117 
CO -0.710 1.178 -0.497 -0.010 
AZ -1.374 0.622 0.592 -0.053 
HI -0.794 0.737 -0.116 -0.058 
CT 0.081 1.193 -1.687 -0.138 
KY -0.700 0.302 -0.216 -0.205 
NM -1.288 0.586 -0.016 -0.239 
WI -0.174 0.888 -1.440 -0.242 
NV -1.083 0.578 -0.272 -0.259 
IN -0.364 1.064 -2.056 -0.452 
MO -0.779 0.416 -1.245 -0.536 
NC -1.002 0.507 -1.158 -0.551 
MI -0.295 0.740 -3.111 -0.889 
We use the common and commercial law productivity and opinion quality rankings for the 
composite rankings. Due to the relatively small number of opposing opinions available to 
calculate the independence ranking, we use the independence ranking based on all opinions. 
For each measure (total opinions per judge-year, outside citations per judge-year, and 
independence) we computed the standard deviation from the mean of the sample for each state. 
For those states without an independence score, we substituted the mean independence score for 
the other states in computing the standard deviation. We then combined the three standard 
deviation scores with equal weights to generate the equal-weight composite score. 
Correlation coefficient between common law composite rankings and composite rankings (all 
subject matter areas) in Table 9 = 0.754 (t-statistic = 8.811; significant at the <1 percent level). 
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APPENDIX B: ABNORMAL SCORE RANKINGS 
Number of Opinions (Abnormal Score) 
State Sel. System Opinions Judge-Years Ab. Opinions per 
Judge-Year 
GA NE 1225 21 29.712 
OH NE 989 21 21.263 
AR PE 1038 21 18.589 
PA PE 941 21 16.909 
MT NE 968 21 15.231 
IN M 573 15 13.831 
CT AP 707 23 13.418 
ND NE 703 16 13.145 
WY M 548 15 12.623 
FL M 709 21 11.214 
AL PE 1417 30 10.754 
MA AP 608 23 7.800 
UT M 420 17 6.501 
IL PE 642 22 6.372 
NE M 699 23 5.298 
CA M 605 21 4.451 
MS PE 1437 29 3.082 
AK M 446 18 2.201 
NV NE 259 18 2.174 
WA NE 578 28 2.096 
IA M 715 28 1.076 
ID NE 477 16 -0.054 
AZ M 172 15 -1.335 
OR NE 245 21 -1.384 
TN M 373 16 -2.386 
MN NE 452 24 -2.716 
CO M 386 23 -2.792 
MD M 523 22 -3.084 
KS M 483 21 -3.276 
TX_CRIM PE 583 26 -3.396 
SD M 366 15 -4.101 
ME AP 718 26 -4.741 
NM PE 151 15 -5.087 
RI AP 273 15 -6.133 
HI AP 225 18 -6.422 
DE AP 163 15 -6.525 
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WI NE 386 21 -6.733 
VT AP 274 15 -6.746 
NH AP 366 17 -6.881 
NJ AP 376 27 -7.715 
SC AP 387 16 -8.702 
NY AP 380 22 -8.963 
WV PE 346 15 -9.003 
MI NE 389 24 -9.120 
OK_CIV M 435 28 -10.752 
LA NE 525 24 -10.913 
VA AP 413 21 -11.563 
OK_CRIM M 230 16 -11.912 
KY NE 411 22 -12.525 
TX_CIV PE 347 27 -12.967 
MO M 252 22 -13.324 
NC PE 262 23 -16.490 
Abnormal total opinions per judge-year was calculated by first estimating a model using total 
opinions per judge-year as the dependent variable and state-level controls for the age of the 
state, the log of the population, the log of the aggregate population of neighboring states, the 
state’s crime rate, the median age of the population, the log of gross state product, the median 
income level for 1997, the black fraction of the population, and a measure of citizen ideology for 
the state based on election results in each district which are used to compute a statewide average 
(ultimately based on interest group ratings of a given state’s federal congressional delegation) 
(from Berry et al. 1998) (the Citizen Ideology Score). (See Appendix D for definitions.) We 
estimated the model using pooled state-level data over the 1998 to 2000 sample period using 
ordinary least square as follows: 
Total opinions per judge-yeari = α + ∑ßji State-Level Controlsji + εi 
Second, we computed predicted scores for total opinions per judge-year using the model and 
then calculated the difference between the actual and predicted scores. We term this residual the 
“abnormal” score for total opinions per judge-year (for example, the abnormal total opinions per 
judge-year for a state = the actual total opinions per judge-year minus the predicted total 
opinions per judge-year). 
Correlation coefficient between abnormal opinions per judge-year score and opinions per judge-
year score (all subject matter areas) in Table 4 = 0.8548 (t-statistic = 11.64; significant at the <1 
percent level). 
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Out-of-State Citations to Majority Opinions (Abnormal Score) 
State Sel. System Citations Judge-Years Ab. Citations per 
Judge-Year 
CA M 709 21 18.472 
MT NE 468 21 10.720 
DE AP 336 15 7.309 
WA NE 611 28 7.047 
AR PE 337 21 5.968 
KS M 388 21 5.800 
ND NE 316 16 5.300 
MD M 448 22 4.597 
TN M 242 16 4.475 
SC AP 245 16 4.142 
NE M 371 23 3.483 
AZ M 187 15 3.467 
IN M 244 15 3.224 
MA AP 469 23 2.811 
OH NE 337 21 2.411 
NM PE 143 15 1.790 
CO M 382 23 1.743 
IA M 403 28 1.153 
IL PE 354 22 0.970 
PA PE 336 21 0.631 
WV PE 206 15 0.526 
MS PE 322 29 0.334 
GA NE 262 21 0.269 
SD M 196 15 0.155 
VT AP 206 15 0.042 
WY M 184 15 -0.001 
AL PE 325 30 -0.523 
CT AP 405 23 -0.647 
NJ AP 474 27 -0.708 
AK M 273 18 -1.021 
UT M 134 17 -1.294 
FL M 208 21 -1.428 
ID NE 148 16 -1.436 
NY AP 301 22 -2.526 
MN NE 321 24 -2.573 
NH AP 225 17 -2.925 
LA NE 159 24 -3.178 
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VA AP 261 21 -3.310 
NV NE 157 18 -3.345 
WI NE 256 21 -3.381 
TX_CIV PE 243 27 -3.451 
OK_CIV M 160 28 -3.621 
OR NE 137 21 -4.398 
ME AP 284 26 -4.547 
NC PE 170 23 -5.181 
KY NE 145 22 -5.323 
OK_CRIM M 59 16 -5.648 
RI AP 131 15 -5.895 
MI NE 208 24 -6.027 
MO M 115 22 -7.277 
TX_CRIM PE 105 26 -8.412 
HI AP 150 18 -8.763 
We calculated abnormal outside state citations per judge-year by first estimating a model using 
outside state citations per judge-year as the dependent variable and state-level controls for the 
age of the state, the log of the population, the log of the aggregate population of neighboring 
states, the state’s crime rate, the median age of the population, the log of gross state product, the 
median income level for 1997, the black fraction of the population, and a measure of citizen 
ideology for the state based on election results in each district which are used to compute a 
statewide average (ultimately based on interest group ratings of a given state’s federal 
congressional delegation) (from Berry et al. 1998) (the Citizen Ideology Score). (See Appendix 
D for definitions.) We estimated the model using pooled state-level data for our dependent 
variables over the 1998 to 2000 sample period using ordinary least square as follows: 
Outside citations per judge-yeari = α + ∑ßjiState-Level Controlsji + εi 
Second, we computed predicted scores for outside state citations per judge-year using the model 
and then calculated the difference between the actual and predicted scores. We term this residual 
the “abnormal” score for the outside-state citations per judge-year. 
Correlation coefficient between abnormal independence score and independence score (all 
subject matter areas) in Table 5 = 0.8905 (t-statistic = 13.84; significant at the <1 percent level). 
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Independence (Abnormal Score) 
State Sel. System Independence Judge-Years Ab. Indep. 
OK_CIV M 0.086 28 0.154 
NY AP 0.146 22 0.150 
NH AP 0.057 17 0.138 
RI AP 0.194 15 0.135 
OR NE 0.126 21 0.125 
NE M 0.022 23 0.087 
MS PE 0.028 29 0.075 
IL PE 0.028 22 0.065 
NJ AP -0.038 27 0.061 
OH NE 0.031 21 0.059 
KS M -0.013 21 0.053 
WV PE 0.027 15 0.037 
MD M -0.030 22 0.037 
FL M 0.009 21 0.036 
LA NE 0.008 24 0.033 
IA M -0.019 28 0.032 
AZ M 0.024 15 0.032 
UT M 0.097 17 0.029 
AR PE 0.027 21 0.028 
AK M -0.093 18 0.027 
PA PE -0.032 21 0.026 
WA NE -0.027 28 0.026 
TX_CIV PE 0.042 27 0.025 
TN M 0.012 16 0.017 
ND NE 0.007 16 0.017 
MN NE -0.038 24 0.015 
CA M 0.003 21 0.008 
VA AP -0.085 21 0.006 
HI AP -0.039 18 0.000 
SD M -0.030 15 -0.004 
GA NE -0.030 21 -0.005 
CO M -0.074 23 -0.009 
KY NE -0.048 22 -0.010 
MA AP -0.002 23 -0.011 
NV NE -0.053 18 -0.012 
WY M -0.090 15 -0.018 
SC AP -0.030 16 -0.028 
AL PE -0.084 30 -0.037 
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VT AP -0.003 15 -0.039 
TX_CRIM PE -0.032 26 -0.049 
MT NE -0.060 21 -0.050 
DE AP -0.119 15 -0.054 
NM PE -0.030 15 -0.064 
OK_CRIM M -0.140 16 -0.073 
WI NE -0.158 21 -0.088 
CT AP -0.180 23 -0.101 
ME AP -0.073 26 -0.108 
ID NE -0.151 16 -0.110 
NC PE -0.133 23 -0.114 
MO M -0.141 22 -0.115 
IN M -0.213 15 -0.175 
MI NE -0.308 24 -0.259 
We calculated the abnormal independence score by first estimating a model using the 
independence score as the dependent variable and state-level controls for the age of the state, the 
log of the population, the log of the aggregate population of neighboring states, the state’s crime 
rate, the median age of the population, the log of gross state product, and the median income 
level for 1997, the black fraction of the population, and a measure of citizen ideology for the state 
based on election results in each district which are used to compute a statewide average 
(ultimately based on interest group ratings of a given state’s federal congressional delegation) 
(from Berry et al. 1998) (the Citizen Ideology Score). (See Appendix D for definitions.) We 
estimated the model using pooled state-level data for our dependent variables over the 1998 to 
2000 sample period using ordinary least square as follows: 
Independencei = α + ∑ßjiState-Level Controlsji + εi 
Second, we computed predicted scores for independence using the model and then calculated the 
difference between the actual and predicted scores. For those states without an independence 
score, we substituted the mean independence score for the other states as the actual 
independence score. We term this residual the “abnormal” score for independence. 
Correlation coefficient between abnormal independence score and independence score (all 
subject matter areas) in Table 8 = 0.905 (t-statistic = 15.04; significant at the <1 percent level). 
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Abnormal Equal-Weight Composite Ranking 














CA 0.432 3.702 0.102 1.412 
AR 1.806 1.196 0.355 1.119 
OH 2.065 0.483 0.742 1.097 
MT 1.479 2.149 -0.629 1.000 
GA 2.886 0.054 -0.060 0.960 
ND 1.277 1.062 0.211 0.850 
NE 0.515 0.698 1.092 0.768 
PA 1.642 0.127 0.329 0.699 
WA 0.204 1.412 0.322 0.646 
IL 0.619 0.194 0.813 0.542 
KS -0.318 1.163 0.662 0.502 
MS 0.299 0.067 0.937 0.434 
FL 1.089 -0.286 0.448 0.417 
MA 0.758 0.563 -0.135 0.395 
MD -0.300 0.921 0.463 0.361 
WY 1.226 0.000 -0.227 0.333 
AZ -0.130 0.695 0.395 0.320 
TN -0.232 0.897 0.213 0.293 
UT 0.631 -0.259 0.364 0.245 
IA 0.104 0.231 0.397 0.244 
OR -0.134 -0.882 1.562 0.182 
NY -0.871 -0.506 1.872 0.165 
AL 1.045 -0.105 -0.457 0.161 
NH -0.668 -0.586 1.722 0.156 
AK 0.214 -0.205 0.337 0.115 
DE -0.634 1.465 -0.677 0.052 
OK_CIV -1.044 -0.726 1.923 0.051 
CO -0.271 0.349 -0.118 -0.013 
RI -0.596 -1.182 1.693 -0.028 
CT 1.303 -0.130 -1.266 -0.031 
NJ -0.749 -0.142 0.757 -0.045 
IN 1.343 0.646 -2.184 -0.065 
WV -0.874 0.105 0.467 -0.101 
SC -0.845 0.830 -0.349 -0.121 
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SD -0.398 0.031 -0.046 -0.138 
MN -0.264 -0.516 0.186 -0.198 
NV 0.211 -0.670 -0.146 -0.202 
NM -0.494 0.359 -0.794 -0.310 
VT -0.655 0.008 -0.482 -0.376 
LA -1.060 -0.637 0.414 -0.428 
TX_CIV -1.260 -0.692 0.307 -0.548 
ID -0.005 -0.288 -1.378 -0.557 
VA -1.123 -0.663 0.071 -0.572 
HI -0.624 -1.756 0.003 -0.792 
KY -1.217 -1.067 -0.126 -0.803 
WI -0.654 -0.678 -1.100 -0.811 
TX_CRIM -0.330 -1.686 -0.618 -0.878 
ME -0.461 -0.911 -1.350 -0.907 
OK_CRIM -1.157 -1.132 -0.909 -1.066 
NC -1.602 -1.038 -1.431 -1.357 
MO -1.294 -1.459 -1.434 -1.396 
MI -0.886 -1.208 -3.241 -1.778 
For each measure (abnormal total opinions per judge-year, abnormal outside citations per judge-
year, and abnormal independence), we computed the standard deviation from the mean of the 
sample for each state. We then combined the three standard deviation scores with equal weights 
to generate the equal-weight composite score. 
Correlation coefficient between abnormal composite rankings and composite rankings (all 
subject matter areas) in Table 9 = 0.936 (t-statistic = 18.84; significant at the <1 percent level). 
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APPENDIX C: JUDGE RANKING USING MAJORITY OPINION 
PRODUCTIVITY MEASURE 
Linear Combinations of Influence, Productivity, and Independence For 
All Subject Matter Areas (Productivity, Opinion Quality, 
Independence) 
[Productivity] 
                                                                        Boehm [IN] 
                                                                        Houston [AL] 
                                                                        Fletcher [GA] 
                                                                        (1,0,0) 
                                            Boehm [IN]                                 Boehm [IN] 
                                            Hunstein [GA]                            Hunstein [GA] 
                                            Houston [AL]                              Fletcher [GA] 
                                            (.75,.25,0)                                      (.75,0,.25) 
                                                                       Boehm [IN] 
                                                                       Hunstein [GA] 
                                                                       Carley [GA] 
                      Boehm [IN]                            (.67,.16,.16)                                   Maddox [CT] 
                      Brown [CA]                                                                                   Walsh [AL] 
                       Nelson [MT]                                                                                 Wathen† [ME] 
                       (.5,.5,0)                                                                                           (.5,0,.5) 
                                              Boehm [IN]                                 Walsh [CT] 
                                              Nelson  [MT]                               Maddox† [AL] 
                                              Brown [CA]                                Boehm [IN] 
                                              (.42,.42,.16)                                  (.42,.16,.42) 
                                                                       Boehm [CA] 
                                                                       Nelson  [MT] 
                                                                       Walsh [NY] 
               Brown [CA]                                  (.33,.33,.33)                                           Walsh [DE] 
               Baxter [CA]                                                                                                  Ciparick [NY] 
               Boehm [IN]         Brown [CA]                                     Walsh [DE]         Leeson [OR] 
               (.25,.75,0)            Baxter [CA]                                      Ciparick [NY]     (.25,0,.75) 
                                             Greaney [MA                                  Leeson [OR] 
                                             (.16,.67,.16)      Walsh [DE]            (.16,.16,.67) 
                                                                        Brown [CA] 
                                                                        Baxter [CA] 
                                                                        (.16,.42,.42) 
Brown [CA]              Brown [CA]              Walsh [DE]               Walsh [DE]           Walsh [DE] 
Baxter [CA]               Baxter [CA]              Brown [CA]               Ciparick [NY]     Leeson [OR] 
Johnson [WA]            Greaney [MA]         Baxter [CA]               Leeson [OR]     Ciparick [NY] 
(0,1,0)                      (0,.75,.25)                   (0,.5,.5)                        (0,.25,.75)           (0,0,1) 
[Opinion Quality]                                                                                                      [Independence] 
†Judge retired prior to 2002 
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APPENDIX D: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Court-Level Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Adjusted Associate 
Justice Salary 
 The associate justice salary reported in 1997 divided by the cost 
of living adjustment for 1998 (in thousands of dollars). 
   
Adjusted Partner 
Salary 
 The average partner salary in 1998 divided by the cost of living 
adjustment for 1998 (in thousands of dollars). 
   
Stable Court  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state high court justices stayed 
the same from 1998 to 2000 and 0 otherwise. 
   
Number of Active 
Judges on Bench 
 Number of judges who were active at any time from 1998 to 2000 
for the state in question. 
   
No Mandatory 
Retirement 
 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judges on the state high court 
do not face mandatory retirement and 0 otherwise. 
   
Long-Term Clerk  Indicator variable equal to 1 if state clerks are tenured for more 
than one year and 0 if tenure is 1 year or less. 
   
Number of Clerks 
per Judge 
 Average number of clerks per judge in the 1998 to 2000 time 
period. 
   
Law Clerk 
Opportunity Cost 
 The difference between the average salary of an entering 
associate at law firm in that state and the law clerk salary (in 
thousands of dollars).  
   
Number of Trial 
Cases in the State 
 Number of trial cases in the entire state in 1998 (in thousands). 
   
Intermediate 
Appellate Court 
 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the opinion is in opposition to the 
opinion of another judge in the same case and 0 otherwise. In the 
case of a dissenting opinion written by the judge, the opinion is 
treated as in active opposition to the majority opinion. In the case 
of a majority opinion by the judge in question, active opposition 
exists if the majority opinion is opposed by a dissenting opinion. 
   
Mandatory 
Publication 
 Indicator variable equal to 1 if judges on the state high court face 
a mandatory publication rule and 0 otherwise.  
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State-Level Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
State Age Age of the state in 1998.  
  
State Population The population of the state in millions measured in 1997.  
  
Border Population Total population of all bordering states of the state in question 
(measured as of 1997 in millions). 
  
Crime Index Overall crime rate for the state (including property and violent 
crime) per 100,000 people from the FBI Uniform Crime Report 
for 1997, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/97cius.htm.  
  
Gross State Product Gross State Product (measured as of 1998 in billion of dollars). 
  
Median Age of Population Median age of state population (2000 U.S. Census). 
  
State Median Income Median per capita income of the state population (2000 U.S. 
Census in thousands of dollars). 
  
Black Population Fraction Fraction of the population comprised of blacks as obtained from 
the 2000 Census. 
  
Citizen Ideology Score Measure of citizen ideology based on election results in each 
district, which are then used to compute a statewide average 
(ultimately based on interest group ratings of a given state’s 
federal congressional delegation) (from Berry et al. 1998). 
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Judge-Level Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Chief Judge  For the Opinions and Citations models, indicator variable equal to 
1 if the judge in question is the chief judge of the court in the year 
the opinion was authored and 0 otherwise. For the Independence 
model, indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in question is the 
chief judge of the court for any year from 1998 to 2000 and 0 
otherwise. 
   
Yrs. Court Experience  For the Opinions and Citations models, the difference between the 
year the opinion was authored and the year the judge first joined 
the high court. For the Independence model, the difference 
between 1998 and the year the judge first joined the high court (if 
the judge started on the court in 1998 or later court experience is 
set to 0). 
   
Yrs. Legal Experience  The difference between 1998 and the year the judge graduated law 
school. 
   
Retired before 2002  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge retired prior to 2002 and 0 
otherwise. 
   
Age  Age of the judge in years measured as of 1998 for the 
Independence model and as of the year the opinion was authored 
for the Opinions and Citations models. 
   
Female  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge is female and 0 if male. 
   
Private Prac. Exp.  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge had private practice 
experience before becoming a judge and 0 otherwise. 
   
Election Spending  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge raised funds relating to 
election campaign expenditures for the year the opinion was 
authored (for the Opinions and Citations models) and 0 otherwise. 
   
Judge Ideology  Ideology score for each judge as developed by Brace, Hall & 
Langer (2000). These scores locate judges on a political continuum 
from highly conservative (0) to highly liberal (100). 
   
U.S. News Law School 
Ranking 
The U.S. News ranking of the judge’s law school measured as of 
2005. 
   
Attended In-State Law 
School 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge attended an in-state law 
school and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
